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RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S "ANSWER TO 'STATEMENT OF ISSUES/M 
In the Reply (sic) Brief of Appellee Parker M. Nielson 
(hereafter "Nielson") purports to redefine the issues on appeal 
as being limited to only those issues that he wants to discuss, 
i.e. sanctions against Gurley's counsel and alleged untimely 
filing of the Notices of Appeal. The issues are correctly set 
forth in the Brief of Appellant. Argument relative to Nielson's 
claim of untimely filing of a Notice of Appeal is addressed 
herein and in Appellant's Verified Memorandum in Opposition to 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, filed in the Utah 
Supreme Court and attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 
With regard to the personal attack leveled at Gurley's 
counsel throughout Nielson's brief, counsel refuses to be baited 
into Nielson's game of name-calling. Contrary to Nielson's 
misrepresentation, counsel for Gurley has not been "sanctioned" 
by the Utah Supreme Court or by any other court in the State of 
Utah. His attempt to frame the issues in this case as ones of 
credibility of counsel is an obvious attempt to avoid discussion 
of the legal principles and case law relevant to the 
jurisdictional, governmental immunity and summary judgment issues 
presented on appeal. 
RESPONSE TO NIELSON'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" 
AND "STATEMENT OF FACTS" 
Nielson has complained that the Brief of Appellant fails to 
cite to the record. To assist the Court in making reference to 
the pivotal pleadings in this case, an Addendum was prepared and 
submitted with the Brief of Appellant. All of the documents in 
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the Addendum are copies of pleadings filed in this case and 
Nielson's opposition brief does not dispute their accuracy or 
authenticity. However, in order to resolve any confusion, 
counsel for Gurley has prepared an index to the Addendum which 
cross-references the record as Bates stamped by the Third 
District Court. It should be noted, however, that the trial 
exhibits which are part of the Addendum do not carry a Bates 
stamp from the Clerk and that, as of the filing of this Brief, 
many of the pleadings from Nielson's second, identical action, 
filed one year after the first action, have not been Bates 
stamped by the Third District Court. These two actions were 
subsequently consolidated by the trial court. 
In his Statement of the Case, Nielson asserts that "after 
Summary Judgment was entered, Gurley asserted that he acted as a 
peace officer." Contrary to this assertion, Gurley asserted in 
his Answer and throughout these proceedings that at the time he 
seized the trap he did so under color of authority as a peace 
officer for the Division of Wildlife Resources. Although Mr. 
Gurley's counsel, in answering plaintiff's Complaint, did not 
call Mr. Gurley a "peace officer", his affirmative defenses made 
clear his allegation that Gurley was acting as a government 
employee and was entitled to the defenses afforded him by reason 
of his governmental status. See, e.g.. Eighth Defense 
(Governmental Immunity), Ninth Defense (failure of plaintiff to 
file an undertaking as required by the Governmental Immunity 
Act), Tenth Defense (Defendant's acts authorized by law), Twelfth 
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Defense (limitation of recovery under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act), Thirteenth Defcmse (Defendant acting in the course 
of his employment, in good faith, and entitled to immunity 
afforded public officials), Fifteenth Defense (absolute and 
qualified immunity). (Answer and Jury Demand, Addendum at 446; 
R. at 30-36). 
Nielson makes the argument that Gurley cannot discuss 
"facts" except as stated by Judge Young in his Summary Judgment 
and/or his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered after 
trial on the damages issues. Appellant clearly is not so 
limited. Indeed, appellant asserts that the "facts" determined 
by the trial court in granting summary judgment were improper 
because there were questions of fact which the court could not 
properly resolve on summary judgment. Thus, it is incumbent upon 
appellant to point to the disputed facts in order to make his 
argument. 
With regard to the jurisdictional issues, the facts 
regarding Officer Gurley,s status at the time the trap was seized 
are facts from the record, which cannot be disputed. In addition 
to the Affidavit submitted by Officer Gurley, which he claims was 
improperly stricken months after the trial court granted 
plaintiffs summary judgment on liability, Officer Gurley 
testified at the damages trial regarding his status. At no time 
did Nielson submit evidence to contradict Gurley's assertions 
that he was in uniform, on duty as a peace officer for the 
Division of Wildlife Resources, driving his Division of Wildlife 
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Resources vehicle and operating under color of authority as a 
peace officer of the State of Utah when seizing the trap. (T.R. 
p. 285, Addendum p. 516, Trial Exhibit 14). 
As an accommodation to the Court to speed up the trial 
process, Officer Gurley submitted his direct testimony at the 
damages hearing by affidavit (Id.) In that Affidavit, the first 
ten paragraphs establish that Officer Gurley was a peace officer 
employed as a conservation officer for the Division of Wildlife 
Resources, that he was so employed on September 8, 1990, and that 
he seized the trap in question pursuant to his authority under 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1 as an exercise of his police authority. 
At the time the Affidavit was submitted to the Court, Mr. Nielson 
advised the Court as follows: 
MR. NIELSON: And I simply advised the Court what 
[my objections to the Affidavit] are. I have no 
problem with this Affidavit other than with respect to 
paragraphs 14, 15, 17, 18 and 19. And my problem with 
those is that those are paragraphs in which — of 
course, this, as Mr. Ferguson, this is an Affidavit 
that was prepared for another purpose, and that 
explains why these things are in here, but I don't 
think they have any relevance to this case. 
(T.R. p. 285) 
Dale Gurley's status as a peace officer was also verified by 
the testimony of his supervisor Delbert Atkinson (T.R. p. 23 0-
244) . 
Similarly, the "facts" with regard to the procedural history 
of this case are taken from the record and the pleadings on file. 
Clearly, because the trial court refused to decide on the merits 
Gurley's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss, there 
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are no "factual findings" at all regarding the issues of 
jurisdiction and governmental immunity• It is just as clear that 
appellant is claiming that the trial court erred in holding that 
the defense of subject matter jurisdiction and the defense of 
governmental immunity had been waived. Facts necessary to decide 
these legal issues are contained in the pleadings, were raised by 
motion below and are properly before this Court. 
Moreover, the rulings of the trial court clearly indicate 
that Judge Young was treating this case as one against not only 
Officer Gurley, but the State of Utah and the Division of 
Wildlife Resources and its other employees, as well. Indeed, the 
finding of the trial court of "bad faith" litigation, which is 
used by the trial court to justify an award of attorneys' fees 
against Gurley, is that "the Division of Wildlife Resources 
should have readily offered to remove the defendant from further 
enforcement activities on this property knowing full well that 
the defendant maintained continuing hostility towards the 
plaintiff and his activities." (Memorandum Decision, f 15, 
Addendum p. 047, R. 1912). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because 
of plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice provisions of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. As a matter of law, 
therefore, the Partial Summary Judgment and Judgment entered 
against defendant must be reversed and the case dismissed for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
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In addition, plaintiff's claims against defendant are barred 
by the immunity provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Plaintiff's claims, regardless of how he characterizes them, 
arise out of an alleged institution of a judicial proceeding 
without probable cause. Immunity is preserved for such claims 
under § 63-30-10(5). 
The trial court's award of sanctions in the nature of 
attorney's fees against defendant is in error. Plaintiff, as a 
pro se litigant, is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
in connection with this action. The order granting sanctions in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendant also fails to make 
appropriate evidentiary findings justifying said sanction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NIELSON HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS THE CURRENT 
STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENT WHICH CLEARLY 
APPLIES TO THIS ACTION 
Nielson's arguments with regard to compliance with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 et seq., 
contradict each other and are disingenuous. First, he argues 
that compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act was not 
required because, as a matter of law, Officer Gurley was 
overzealous and, therefore, outside of the scope of his 
employment. Of course, in making this argument, Nielson ignores 
the "color of authority" language of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. One can only assume that, because he is a licensed 
attorney in the State of Utah, Nielson was aware of the Utah 
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Governmental Immunity Act and its notice provisions and 
intentionally ignored them when he filed legal action ten days 
after the occurrence and without providing prior notice to the 
appropriate governmental entities. 
In contradiction of his argument that he need not comply 
with the Governmental Immunity Act, Nielson next argues that he 
did comply by filing, a year later, another legal action based 
upon the identical facts and allegations in the first action. 
His argument is that the first legal action sufficed as notice 
for the second legal action. Of course, Nielson ignores the fact 
that in filing both legal actions, he did not wait to file them 
until after the governmental entities had made a decision with 
regard to approval or disapproval of the claims or until after 
the ninety-day consideration period had lapsed. Clearly, Nielson 
never intended to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act and 
his argument that he accidentally did so is without legal or 
factual merit. 
A. Nielson commenced both of his actions without complying with 
the statutory notice requirements. 
Nielson cannot in good faith dispute that he did not provide 
notice of claim before commencing this action against Officer 
Gurley on September 17, 1990. Nielson's Complaint was, in fact, 
filed only ten days after the incident upon which it is based. 
See Complaint (Addendum 2 61, R. 022). 
Nielson apparently attempted to correct his failure to 
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, circumvent its 
notice requirement, and preserve the improper partial summary 
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judgment by filing a second, identical1 lawsuit (hereafter 
"second action") in the same court one year later. 
The second action was filed while the first action was still 
pending. Once more, it was filed without the prerequisite 
notice. Although Nielson claims he served notice for this second 
action on September 3, 1991 (Resp. Brf., p. 7, n. 1), such notice 
is also untimely because it was commenced only six days later 
(September 9, 1991), without being denied by the governmental 
entities and prior to the running of the statutory ninety-day 
period of consideration. 
The statutory notice requirement is jurisdictional. It is a 
precondition to suit. Lamarr v. Utah Dept. of Trans., 828 P.2d 
535, 540 (Utah App. 1992) . Nowhere in Nielson's opposition brief 
does he attempt to distinguish Lamarr, discredit its holding or 
even discuss it. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act notice 
requirement clearly precludes any action commenced against a 
government employee prior to ninety days following proper notice, 
unless the notice of claim is denied earlier by the government. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-15; 63-30-14. 
After commencing his second action, Nielson moved for 
consolidation of the two identical actions and now argues that 
the Complaint in the first action served as statutory notice of 
the second, identical action. (Resp. Brf. p. 19). He also 
Prior to filing the second lawsuit, Nielson amended his Complaint in 
the first action. (R. 341). The Complaint in the second action contained 
identical claims to those in the prior first action's Amended Complaint. (R. 
328-341). 
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claims that the untimely notice given with respect to the second 
action somehow cures the first action and allows preservation of 
the partial summary judgment which was entered when the court 
lacked jurisdiction. 
To sanction such procedural maneuvering would allow 
plaintiffs in every instance to circumvent the plain notice 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has explained that neither "effective" notice 
nor "actual" notice can cure a failure to comply with the notice 
provisions. Lamarr, 828 P. 2d at 541. ff[I]t is quite clear that 
the legislature intended to make the filing of a timely notice of 
claim prerequisite to maintaining an action." Id. (quoting Varoz 
v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1973). 
Nielson has obviously not complied with the statutory notice 
requirement. The District Court never had jurisdiction to hear 
the claims asserted against Officer Gurley. Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 
540. 
B. The statutory notice requirement applies to this case. 
Nielson does not and cannot dispute Gurley's legal argument 
that lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a defense which 
cannot be waived. Rule 12(h)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(Resp. Brf. pp. 15-19); Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540. Instead, 
Nielson argues that the notice requirement does not apply to this 
action.2 In doing so, however, he ignores his own express 
2
 In apparent confusion, Nielson cites Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 
808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991) as authority for his argument that failure to comply 
with the governmental notice requirement is waivable. Watkiss addresses only 
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allegations, the trial Court's Memorandum Decision and the 
current statutory language and case law. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-11(2) (1991) clearly provides: 
Any person having a claim against a governmental 
entity, or against an employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of his employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the 
entity before maintaining an action, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
This same language is iterated in § 63-30-12 (1987) : 
A claim against the state, or against its employee 
for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one year after the claim arises, ...., 
regardless of whether the function giving rise to the 
claim is characterized as governmental. 
Nielson argues that the notice requirement does not apply 
because the acts or omissions of Officer Gurley did not occur 
during the performance of his duties or "under color of 
authority.11 Resp. Brf., pp. 15-18. It is amazing that Nielson 
dares to make this argument in light of his prior allegations. 
On April 29, 1992, Nielson filed a yet a third action in the 
Third District Court against Officer Gurley based on the same 
operative facts as this case. In his Complaint in that action, 
Nielson expressly alleged: 
a defendant's failure to raise defective service of process as a defense. The 
case has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction. 808 P.2d 1066. 
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The conduct of . . . Gurley was performed under 
color of various statutes, ordinances, regulations, 
customs or usages of the State of Utah . . . . 
See Complaint, p. 22, <J[ 60, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.3 
Not only is Nielson's argument disingenuous, but, it 
improperly equates the distinct legal concepts of "scope of 
employment" and "color of authority" and mistakenly confuses the 
threshold jurisdictional notice requirement with the ultimate 
issue of immunity. Acceptance of Nielson's interpretation of the 
notice requirements would permit circumvention of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act every time a plaintiff alleged that an 
employee exceeded his/her authority. 
It is obvious from Nielson's own pleadings that his claims 
are not of the type thcit could be made against any ordinary 
citizen. This is not ci case in which the defendant just happens 
to be a governmental employee. Nielson is clearly complaining 
about the way Officer Ckirley carried out, or failed to carry out 
his governmental duties. 
In his Complaint, dated September 17, 1990, Nielson bases 
his claims on allegations that Gurley failed to comply with 
regulations pertaining to "any peace officer or special function 
officer." Verified Complaint, pp. 2-4, 6 and 7 (R. at 019-021, 
016-017). Furthermore, as early as May 1988, Nielson had made 
3
 This third action was removed to the U.S. District Court, District of 
Utah. Recognizing that "It is not disputed that Gurley acted under color of 
state law when he seized portions of plaintiff's bird pen," Judge Greene found 
and ruled that Officer Gurley had probable cause to believe Nielson's pen was 
an illegal trap and dismissed all claims against Gurley on Summary Judgment. 
A copy of Judge Greene's Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. 
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written complaints to the Division of Wildlife Resources 
expressly targeting "at least one of your conservation officers 
(Mr. Dale Gurley, to be specific). . .". (Addendum, p. 479, 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 5) Thus, his statements in his Brief 
that "there was no indication, at any time prior to this action" 
that Gurley acted in a peace officer capacity" (Resp. Brf., p. 5) 
are unbelievable. 
Finally, even the trial Court's Summary Judgment decision 
was clearly based on defendant's conduct as a peace officer: 
Further, the defendant knew or should have been 
chargeable with the duty to know that his predetermined 
opinions were improper as a wildlife resources 
enforcement peace officer and that those individuals 
engaged in that aspect of sport training were fully 
authorized to engage in such and that defendant's 
conduct in complicating their activities was an 
inappropriate predilection and bias from which the 
defendant should have refrained. 
. . . 
The court further finds that the defendant went beyond 
his appropriate duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by 
contacting the United States Forest Service and the Utah 
Division of Lands and Forestry and their officials in 
seeking to have those government agencies investigate the 
activities of the plaintiff and create problems for the 
plaintiff in conducting his appropriate and lawful 
activities. 
. . . 
The court finds that the supervisors of the 
defendant in the Division of Wildlife Resources knew or 
should have known of the defendant's dislike for the 
activities of the plaintiff and others engaged in 
similar dog training activities and that they should 
have appropriately disciplined the defendant prior to 
the destruction by the defendant of the plaintiff's 
pen. 
. . . 
Peace officers, including conservation officers such as 
the defendant, are prohibited from breaking into an 
enclosure such as that owned by the plaintiff. 
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[emphasis added] Memorandum Decision, pp. 2-7 (Addendum 43-48, R. 
1909-1915). 
Clearly the actions of which Nielson complained were acts or 
omissions occurring during the performance of Officer Gurley's 
duties. In essence, Nielson claims that Gurley failed to follow 
the procedures and rules pertaining to conservation officers. 
Gurley's pleadings and testimony clearly established that he was 
in uniform and on duty as a peace officer for the Division of 
Wildlife Resources when the trap was seized (T. 282, 283, 
Addendum 516, Defendant's Trial Exhibit 14). The portions of the 
trap that were seized were tagged as evidence and stored in a 
Division evidence room. (Id.) These facts were never in 
question. It is patently clear that both Nielson and Judge Young 
viewed Gurley as a state actor. Indeed, Gurley's supervisors, 
although never made parties, were as much a target of plaintiff's 
complaints and the Court's rulings as was Gurley. Nielson simply 
cannot dispute the fact that Gurley was acting under color of 
authority. His sole argument is the legal one that "color of 
authority11 and "scope of authority" are synonymous. As pointed 
out above, this is an argument without legal or logical merit and 
contradicts Nielson's factual allegations in the third Complaint. 
Nielson also confuses the issues of indemnification and 
notice requirements. He argues that if "gross negligence fraud 
or malice" are alleged against a government employee, the notice 
requirement does not apply. (Resp. Brf., p. 18). 
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While he acuses Gurley's counsel of misciting Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) ("Borthick JJ"), it is Nielson 
who actually misrepresents the substance of that opinion. He 
fails to inform this court that Borthick II was decided on the 
old language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11. The Utah Supreme 
Court, in fact, noted that the 1987 amendment to the statute had 
the effect of expressly requiring service of a notice of claim on 
the State in all suits against employees, whether or not any 
judgment might be ultimately payable by the State. 769 P.2d at 
252 and n. 11. 
Borthick II, recognized that the determining factors for 
notice are not whether malice or fraud are alleged, but rather 
whether the underlying actions were "under color of authority" or 
"acts or omissions occurring during the performance of [the 
employee's] duties. See Borthick II, 769 P.2d at 252, n. 11. 
Borthick II actually is dispositive of this issue in favor of 
Officer Gurley. 
The Utah Supreme Court's more recent decision in Yearsley v. 
Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990), also disposes of 
Nielson7s argument by implicitly recognizing that allegations of 
malice are not sufficient to remove claims from the scope of the 
governmental notice requirements. In Yearsley, the plaintiff 
attempted to amend her Complaint against several police officers 
to include claims for "malicious assault and battery and 
malicious arrest and prosecution." The trial court refused to 
allow plaintiff to add the new claims on the grounds that she had 
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failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's 
statutory notice requirements. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, 
recognizing that strict compliance with the notice requirements 
is required for these claims. Id. Nielson's argument that "the 
Governmental Immunity Act does not apply if 'the employee acted 
or failed to act through fraud or malice'11, (Resp. Brf., p. 17), 
is a clear misstatement of Utah law. 
II. 
NIELSON'S CONVERSION, TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
AND DEFAMATION CLAIMS ARE ALL BARRED 
BY THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
In addressing the issue of governmental immunity Nielson 
avoids discussion of the essence of his claims. As Appellant 
Gurley has discussed in his opening Brief, the Utah Supreme Court 
has recognized that immunity is to be applied with regard to the 
actual essence of the conduct out of which the claim arises, 
rather than the spin put on the claim by plaintiff in crafting a 
legal theory. Ledfors v. Emery County School Dist., 849 P.2d 
1162, 1166 (Utah 1993). 
All of Nielson's claims against Officer Gurley clearly arise 
out of Officer Gurley's seizure of Nielson7s bird trap. (See 
Amended Complaint, flf 16-23, Addendum 389, R. 328). Despite 
Nielson's attempt to characterize his claims as tort claims, they 
are essentially and fundamentally claims arising out of "the 
institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause," and are 
barred by the immunity provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 63-30-10(5). Fundamental to Nielson's claims, regardless of 
their characterization, was the allegation that Officer Gurley 
did not have probable cause to seize or interfere with Nielson's 
trap and issue a citation. Contrary to Nielson's argument, 
moreover, the statute expressly reserves immunity for such claims 
even in the presence of allegations of malice. 
It is also vital to remember that the trial court never 
considered Gurley's jurisdictional arguments or governmental 
immunity argument, which Gurley raised by Motion for Summary 
Judgment and by Motion to Dismiss. Rather, the trial court 
improperly ruled that Gurley had waived these defenses. 
The district court clearly erred in denying Officer Gurley's 
Motion For Summary Judgment. 
III. 
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED 
AND THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR IT 
In his opposition brief, Nielson argues that defendant 
failed to file timely notice. Nielson made this same argument by 
way of a Motion for Summary Disposition before the Utah Supreme 
Court. The facts relating to the entry of Judgment and an 
Amended Judgment and extended argument regarding this issue are 
contained in Gurley's Verified Memorandum in Opposition to 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 1. For purposes of examining the 
timeliness of the Notice of Appeal, the following events are 
important and cannot be reasonably disputed: 
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1. On June 24, 1991, the trial court entered Partial 
Summary Judgment in favor of plaintiff on issues of liability. 
(Addendum 174, R. 322-27). 
2. On October 21 and 22, 1992, trial was held on damage 
issues. 
3. On December 18, 1992, the trial court issued a 
Memorandum Decision, which purported to make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of 
$2,3 00 and attorneys' fees in the amount of $15,000. (Addendum 
p. 42, R. 1908-15) . 
4. On December 21, 1992, defendant filed a Notice of 
Appeal, believing that the Memorandum Decision of Judge Young 
could be interpreted as a final order. (R. 1933-34) . 
5. On December 30, 1992, Nielson's counsel hand delivered 
to Gurley's counsel proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law together with a proposed Judgment. At the same time, he 
delivered these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
to the Court. (R. 1945-53). 
6. Under Rule 4-504(2), Gurley had until January 7, 1993, 
to file objections to the form of the pleadings. Therefore, 
under the Rules of Practice, the Court was precluded from signing 
or entering the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
until January 8, 1993. 
7. On January 7, 1993, Gurley's counsel delivered to 
Nielson's counsel and the court a letter setting forth certain 
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objections to the form of the referenced pleadings. (R. 1981-
83) . 
8. The trial court signed the proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment on January 5, 1993, and these 
pleadings were entered by the Clerk on January 7, 1993. Both the 
signing and entry of the pleadings were premature. (R. 1945-53). 
9. Gurley7s counsel was not aware that the Court had 
entered Judgment until January 20, 1993. On January 21, 1993, 
Gurley's counsel filed a Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered January 5, 1993. (R. 
1979-80). 
10. On January 27, 1993, Judge Young signed an Amended 
Judgment. (R. 1988-89). 
11. On February 26, 1993, appellant filed a Notice of 
Appeal from Amended Judgment. (R. 2071-72). 
Nielson's argument now is that appeal from the Amended 
Judgment is untimely because the Amended Judgment only made 
"clerical" revisions to the Judgment signed by Judge Young on 
January 5, 1993. Thus, he argues that the Amended Judgment 
relates back to the original Judgment and that Gurley had only 
until February 8, 1993, to file the Notice of Appeal. 
Nielson's argument fails on numerous grounds. First, he 
cites the Court to no Utah case that holds that amending a 
judgment to add costs constitutes a "clerical" amendment. 
Second, under Utah law, the premature entry of the original 
Judgment means that it was never "filed" as that term is used in 
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the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 58A(c) (for purposes of 
taking a proper appeal). Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 52 
(Utah 1980); Larsen v. Larsen, 674 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1983); 
Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc. v. Richards, 706 P.2d 1065 
(Utah 1985); Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Co., Ill P.2d 697 (Utah 
1986); Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 750, 
n.2 (Utah App. 1990). Thus, even if Nielson's relation back 
theory applied, the Amended Judgment would have nothing to which 
to relate back because the January 7, 1993, Order is deemed 
legally to have never been "filed". 
Finally, Nielson's argument fails to address the Notice of 
Appeal filed December 21, 1992. (R. 1933-34). While this Notice 
of Appeal was entered prior to the actual Judgment, Rule 4(c) 
expressly provides that such notice is effective to confer 
appellate jurisdiction. Rule 4(c) provides as follows: 
(c) Filing Prior to Entry of Judgment or Order. 
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a 
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of 
the judgment or order of the trial court shall be 
deemed treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
Thus, under Rule 58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even if the 
January 7, 1993, order had been "filed", the Notice of Appeal 
filed on December 21, 1992, is deemed by rule to have been filed 
at the same time. 
Nielson's jurisdictional argument is clearly without merit. 
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IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF DALE GURLEY WITHOUT ENTERING FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND/OR HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Nielson's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley was 
opposed by Gurley and his counsel (Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale 
Gurley or Require Compliance with Rule 7 and 11, R. 802). 
Clearly, there were factual questions regarding the intent of 
Dale Gurley, the truthfulness of the allegations in the 
Affidavit, all of which had to be resolved in ruling on the 
Motion to Strike. Rather than hold an evidentiary hearing, Judge 
Moffat simply adopted plaintiff's assertions that the "Affidavit 
was riddled with untruths". Moreover, the trial court never made 
findings delineating which portions of the Affidavit were true 
and which were untrue. 
In his opposition brief, Nielson does not dispute that the 
trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law with 
regard to the Motion to Strike. Because no findings were 
entered, it is impossible for counsel or this Court to divine 
what was in the trial court's mind. Effective review the court's 
decision is, therefore, rendered impossible. 
Regardless, it is clear that the sanction ordered by Judge 
Moffat runs contrary to Utah law. In his opposing brief, Nielson 
does not dispute the legal principle established by Smith v. 
Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992) that "pro se litigants should 
not recover attorneys' fees, regardless of their professional 
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status." Rather, Nielson argues that the trial court's award to 
him of $3,289 was not an award of attorneys7 fees. This argument 
is simply ridiculous. Judge Moffat's Order reads in relevant 
part: 
3. Sanctions are hereby awarded to Plaintiff and 
against Defendant Dale Gurley in the amount of 
$3,289.00, representing the fair and reasonable value 
of Plaintiff's professional time in searching the 
records of the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts, writing 
correspondence to counsel requesting voluntary 
compliance with Rule 11 and in filing and briefing the 
motion granted herein. (emphasis added) 
Order Striking Affidavit of Dale Gurley and for Rule 11 
Sanctions, 5 3, Addendum at 118, R. 13 67. 
What profession other than the practice of law does Nielson 
have? The evidence supporting the award, moreover, was an 
Affidavit of Parker M. Nielson in the typical form of an 
attorneys' fee affidavit, which itemized the amount of time he 
spent and multiplied it by his hourly rate as an attorney of $13 0 
per hour (Affidavit of Parker M. Nielson, R. 908, attached hereto 
as Exhibit 4). In addition to his own affidavit of attorneys' 
fees, Nielson also submitted the Affidavit of Paul Thomas Moxley, 
Esq., in Support of Parker M. Nielson's Application for 
Reimbursement for Professional Time (R. 910, attached hereto as 
Exhibit 5). In this Affidavit, Mr. Moxley reviews his knowledge 
of Parker M. Nielson's legal experience and expertise and 
confirms that his hourly rate of $13 0 per hour is "a very 
reasonable fee given his experience, expertise and standing in 
the legal community" (R. 909). 
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Nielson's argument that the sanction was an award for 
"professional" services that are somehow different from "legal" 
services is clearly an empty, semantical one that should be 
ignored by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and for the additional 
reasons set forth in the principal brief of appellant, the 
Partial Summary Judgment, Judgment, Amended Judgment, and 
Judgment Awarding Sanctions should all be dismissed and the 
plaintiff's Complaints and causes of action should be dismissed, 
Dated this 10th day of February, /9^4. 
\lAMS & SUNT 
By 
DENNIS C. FERGUSON 
Attorneys for Appellaht 
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Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Daniel D. Darger 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Parker M. Niel^on 
655 South 200 /East 
Salt Lake City, Utkh \84111 
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VERIFIED MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO APPELLEE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Subject to Assignment to the 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Appellate Court No. 920599 
900300302 
Plaintiff/Appellee has moved the Court for summary dismissal 
of defendant's appeal, claiming that the appeal is untimely. 
This memorandum is submitted in opposition. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following are the uncontroverted facts relating to the 
Motion: 
1. On June 24, 1991, the trial court entered partial 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on issues of liability. 
2. On October 21 and 22, 1992, trial was held on damage 
issues. 
3. On December 18, 1992, the trial court issued a 
Memorandum Decision. The Memorandum Decision purported to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and awarded plaintiff 
property damages in the amount of $2,3 00 and attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $15,000. 
4. On December 21, 1992, defendant filed a Notice of 
Appeal, believing that the Memorandum Decision of Judge Young 
could be interpreted as a final order. A copy of the trial 
court's Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. A 
copy of Appellate's Notice of Appeal dated December 21, 1992, is 
attached as Exhibit 2. 
5. On December 22, 1992, counsel for plaintiff mailed a 
proposed judgment. A copy of this proposed judgment and the 
cover letter of plaintiff's counsel are attached as Exhibit 3. 
6. On December 24, 1992, counsel for defendant mailed a 
letter to counsel for plaintiff reflecting objections as to the 
form of the proposed judgment. A copy of this correspondence is 
attached as Exhibit 4. 
7. Subsequently, the parties received a Minute Entry from 
the trial court indicaiting that "plaintiff is requested to 
prepare consistent with the Memorandum Decision and the record, 
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment." 
The Minute Entry also indicates that "any hearing requested to 
consider the final language will be set in Salt Lake [as opposed 
to Tooele County]." A copy of the Court's Minute Entry is 
attached as Exhibit 5. 
7. On December 30, 1992, plaintiff's counsel hand 
delivered to counsel for defendant proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law together with a proposed Judgment. The 
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proposed pleadings were delivered with a cover letter which 
stated: 
I expect that if you have objections, you will 
make them within five days as provided by the rule [4-
504, Code of Judicial Administration]. In the event 
that I do not receive your objections within five days, 
I will submit this Judgment to the Court for entry. I 
believe the clarification set forth in your letter of 
the 24th [of December] are taken care of in the 
findings. If you have other suggestions, please 
contact me. 
Copies of the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Judgment and cover letter of December 30, 1992, are attached as 
Exhibit 6. 
8. Also on December 30, counsel for plaintiff delivered a 
cover letter to Judge David S. Young stating "enclosed are our 
Findings and Conclusions and form of Judgment, pursuant to your 
Minute Entry dated December 18, 1992." This letter to Judge 
Young ended "we will appreciate your execution of these Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment after Mr. Ferguson has an opportunity to 
present any objections he may have." The letter to Judge Young, 
however, did not indicate the date upon which the proposed 
pleadings had been served upon counsel. A copy of this letter is 
attached as Exhibit 7. 
9. Under Rule 4-504(2) copies of proposed findings, 
judgments and orders "shall be served upon opposing counsel 
before being presented to the Court for signature unless the 
Court otherwise orders." The Rule also provides that "notice of 
objection shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five 
days after service." 
10. Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
"when the period of time prescribed or allowed [under these 
Rules] is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays 
and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation." 
11. January 1, 19 93, was a legal holiday. January 2 was a 
Saturday, January 3 was a Sunday. 
12. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, notice of 
objections to the form of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment were due on January 7, 1993. Thus, the first 
day that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
could have been presented to the Court for signature and entry in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was January 8, 
1993 . 
13. On January 7, 1993, appellant's counsel delivered to 
plaintiff's counsel a letter setting forth certain objections as 
to the form of the Judgment and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. A copy of this correspondence is attached as 
Exhibit 8. 
14. On January 13, 1993, the Clerk of the Utah Supreme 
Court mailed to counsel for appellant a letter indicating that 
the transcript had not been ordered and requesting that 
compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, be 
evidenced within ten days. A copy of this correspondence is 
attached as Exhibit 9. 
15. On January 20, 1993, counsel for appellant hand 
delivered a letter to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
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explaining the status of the case and that a final judgment had 
not yet been entered and that it was counsel's understanding that 
under Rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Notice of 
Appeal would be treated as filed after the entry of Judgment "and 
on the day thereof." A copy of this correspondence is attached 
as Exhibit 10. Subsequently, counsel for appellant spoke by 
telephone with counsel for plaintiff. Counsel for plaintiff 
indicated that he thought the Judgment may "already have been 
entered". Therefore, counsel for appellant called the Third 
District Court Clerk, Tooele County, and learned that the 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment had 
been signed by Judge Young on January 5 and entered on January 7, 
1993. Copies of these pleadings are attached hereto as Exhibits 
11 and 12, respectively. 
16. On January 21, 1993, counsel for appellant filed a 
Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment Entered January 5, 1993, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit 13. 
17. On January 22, 1993, plaintiff delivered to counsel for 
appellant a Notice of Entry of Judgment. A copy of the Notice of 
Entry of Judgment is attached as Exhibit 14. 
18. On January 12, 1993, plaintiff mailed a proposed 
Amended Judgment. 
19. On February 2, 1993, plaintiff delivered to counsel for 
appellant a Notice of Entry of Amended Judgment, reflecting that 
Judge Young signed an Amended Judgment on January 27, 19 93. A 
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copy of the Notice of Entry of Amended Judgment is attached as 
Exhibit 15. 
20. On February 26, 1993, appellant filed a Notice of 
Appeal from the Amended Judgment. At the same time, appellant 
filed pleadings with the district court withdrawing his motion to 
set aside the Judgment dated January 5, 1993. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE AMENDED JUDGMENT, ENTERED JANUARY 27, 1993, 
IS THE ONLY "FINAL" ORDER. 
The Judgment signed by Judge Young on January 5 and entered 
by the Third District Clerk on January 7 was done so in 
contravention of Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Because the Judgment was signed and entered 
prematurely, it does not qualify as "filed" as required by Rule 
58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it cannot be 
treated as an order that was "entered". Additionally, even if 
the January 7, 1993, Judgment is treated as a final order, the 
entry of an Amended Judgment on January 27, 1993, became the 
final order and commenced a new thirty day appeal period. 
It cannot be disputed that the Judgment signed by the Court 
on January 5 and entered by the Clerk on January 7, 1993, is one 
which has not been properly "filed". Under the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, defendant was allowed five days after 
service to object to the form of the Judgment. The form of 
Judgment was hand delivered on December 30, 1992. Excluding 
legal holidays and weekends, as required by Rule 6, U.R.C.P., the 
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order could not be presented for the Court's signature until 
January 8, 1993, assuming notice of objections had not been 
delivered. 
A judgment entered in contravention of District Court rules 
cannot be deemed "filed" under Rule 58A(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 52 (1980). In 
Bigelow, like the present case, two judgments had been entered by 
the clerk. The first judgment failed to comport with Rule 2.9(b) 
of the District and Circuit Court Rules of Practice (the 
predecessor to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration) 
because it had not been presented to opposing counsel for 
approval and/or objection. 
Subsequently, the trial court signed a second order 
identical to the first, except that it carried a later date. 
This order, unlike the first, had been presented to opposing 
counsel in accordance with Rule 2.9. The Utah Supreme Court 
held, under these circumstances, that only the second judgment 
was "filed" within the meaning of Rule 58A: 
The notice requirement of Rule 2.9(b) of the 
District and Circuit Court Rules is supplemental to and 
not inconsistent with Rule 58A U.R.C.P. To harmonize 
and give proper effect to these rules, we hold that 
compliance with Rule 2.9(b) is necessary in order that 
a judgment be properly "filed" as that term is used in 
Rule 58A(c), U.R.C.P. 
618 P.2d at 52. The Utah Supreme Court then held that "since the 
second judgment was the only one which complied with both state 
and local rules and hence was the only one properly 'filed' 
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within the meaning of Rule 58A, the notice of appeal was properly 
filed based on the judgment filed January 15." 618 P. 2d at 53. 
The holding in Bicrelow was reaffirmed in Larsen v. Larsen, 
674 P. 2d 116, 117 (Utah 1983). The Utah Supreme Court once again 
held that a judgment which had been prematurely signed by the 
Court in contravention of district court rules of practice was 
deemed, as a matter of law, to have never been "filed" as that 
term is used in Rule 58A(c), U.R.C.P.: 
The mailing certificate on both judgments in this 
case indicates that the parties mailed their respective 
judgments to their opponents on the same day that the 
district court signed them. Thus, the record shows 
that the parties failed to comply with Rule 2.9(b) by 
serving copies of their proposed judgment on their 
opponents before presenting them to the Court for 
execution. We therefore hold that neither judgment has 
been "filed" as that term is used in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 58A(c) for purposes of taking a proper 
appeal. . . . Because no judgment has been "filed" 
within the meaning of the rule, this appeal is 
premature. 
Under the rulings in Bicrelow and Larsen, defendant could not have 
taken an appeal from the January 7 order because it was signed 
before the time for objections had expired under Rule 4-504, Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. This same result was reached in 
Wayne Garff Construction Company, Inc., v. Richards, 706 P.2d 
1065 (Utah 1985) . 
That plaintiff would urge this Court that the January 7 
order is the "final" order is particularly curious given the 
affirmative representations of plaintiff's counsel that no order 
would be presented to the Court for entry until after the five 
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day period allowed by Rule 4-504 had expired. Counsel's letter 
of December 30, 1992, states: 
Thank you for your clarification set out in your 
letter of December 24, 1992. However, since I served 
our previous proposed Judgment, Judge Young has ordered 
that Findings of Fact be prepared. Therefore, pursuant 
to Rule 4-504, C.J.A., I am hereby serving upon you our 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment regarding the above. I expect that if you 
have objections, you will make them within five days as 
provided by the rule. In the event that I do not 
receive your objections within five days, I will submit 
this judgment to the Court for entry. 
On January 7, 1993, within the five day period, a letter was hand 
delivered to plaintiff's counsel setting forth certain 
objections. This letter to plaintiff's counsel closed by asking 
him to call to discuss the objections and attempt to resolve them 
without Court involvement: 
Please give me a call to discuss these objections. 
If we cannot resolve all of them then I will proceed 
with the filing of a formal objection. However, if we 
can resolve the form of the pleadings without further 
Court involvement, I am sure the Court would appreciate 
it. 
I look forward to hearing from you soon with 
regard to the proposed language of the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. Thank you for 
your courtesy. 
No follow-up call or correspondence was ever received from 
plaintiff s counsel. 
Plaintiff's argument that the January 7, 1993, order is the 
operative "final" order from which an appeal must be taken is 
clearly incorrect. Presenting the order to Judge Young for 
signature on January 5, 1993, was a violation not only of Rule 4-
504, but of the specific representations made by counsel for 
plaintiff that no order would be submitted for entry until after 
the five period allowed by Rule 4-504 had expired without notice 
of objection. 
Unlike the first Judgment, plaintiff's proposed Amended 
Judgment was not presented to the Court for signature until after 
the time for objection had expired under Rule 4-504. Therefore, 
it is the only judgment that has been "filed" and entered as 
defined by Rule 58A, U.R.C.P. 
Plaintiff argues that the Amended Judgment constituted only 
a "clerical correction" by adding an award of "costs". 
Therefore, he argues that the January 27 order is automatically a 
"nunc pro tunc" order and reverts back to the date of the January 
7 order. There is, of course, no language in the Amended 
Judgment itself indicating that the order is entered "nunc pro 
tunc". Clearly, an amendment to add costs is more than a 
"clerical" correction. 
In Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986) the 
Utah Supreme Court was faced with a similar argument. On January 
14, 1982, the trial court executed a document entitled "Summary 
Judgment" which awarded Calfo the principal amount on a 
promissory note, plus interest at six percent per annum and 
attorneys' fees. Defendant's counsel complained that he had not 
been properly served with the form of judgment in accordance with 
Rule 2.9(b) of the District Court Rules for Practice. Efforts to 
have plaintiff's counsel voluntarily withdraw the summary 
judgment failed and defendant's counsel then moved the court to 
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strike the judgment. After a series of hearings on the motion to 
strike, the trial court executed an order on June 7, 1983, 
stating that "the Summary Judgment entered by the Court on 
January 14, 1982, was properly signed and entered by the Court on 
that date and is in full force and effect." However, the court's 
June 7, 1983, order did modify the earlier order by deleting the 
awarded interest. The defendant appealed and plaintiff objected 
to the timeliness of the appeal, arguing that the June 7 order 
"merely confirmed the judgment entered on January 14, 1982, 
albeit as redrawn to eliminate interest." 717 P.2d at 699. The 
Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument. Justice Zimmermann, 
speaking for a unanimous court stated: 
The appeal was timely taken. We have previously 
held that unless Rule 2.9(b) of the District and 
Circuit Court Rules of Practice has been complied with, 
the judgment in question is not being "filed" within 
the meaning of Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the time for taking an appeal from that 
judgment under Rule 73(a) [now Rule 4(a) of the Rules 
of Appellate Procedure] does not begin to run because 




EVEN IF THE JANUARY 7, 1993, JUDGMENT COULD 
BE DEEMED "ENTERED" THE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DATED DECEMBER 21, 1992, IS TIMELY. 
It is undisputed that defendant's Notice of Appeal dated 
December 21, 1992, pre-dated entry of the final judgment in this 
case. The Notice of Appeal was filed after the Court issued its 
Memorandum Decision, but before it entered a judgment. 
Plaintiff's argument that this Notice of Appeal is "premature" 
- i i 
and "ineffective to confer appellate jurisdiction" simply ignores 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah case law. 
Rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure expressly deals 
with this exact situation. It provides as follows: 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. 
Except as provided in pairagraph (b) of this Rule, a 
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of 
the judgment or order of the trial court shall be 
deemed treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
Thus, under Rule 58A, even if the January 7, 1993, order had been 
"entered" the Notice of Appeal filed on December 21, 1992, is 
deemed filed on January 7, 1993. 
Plaintiff incorrectly cites the case of DeBry v. Fidelity 
National Title Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah App. 1992) for 
the proposition that "premature notice of appeal is ineffective 
to confer appellate jurisdiction." Memorandum in Support of 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, p. 11. DeBry stands 
for no such proposition. The question presented by DeBry, was 
whether a motion for relief from the judgment filed pursuant to 
Rule 52(b) made the provisions of Rule 4(c) inapplicable and 
required filing of a new notice of appeal under Rule 4(b), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Utah Court of Appeals in DeBry 
held that because relief had been sought under Rule 52(b), 
U.R.C.P., a new notice of appeal was required in accordance with 
Rule 4 (b) . 
Plaintiff also argues that the December 21, 1992, appeal was 
"never perfected" because a docketing statement was not filed 
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within twenty-one days. Once again, plaintiff misreads the rule. 
Rule 9(g) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in part: 
Docketing statements which fail to comply with 
this rule will not be accepted. Failure to comply may 
result in dismissal of the appeal or the petition. 
Clearly, this Court has the power to dismiss a case for 
failure of the appealing party to comply with docketing 
requirements. Brooks v. Department of Employment Security, 736 
P.2d 241 (Utah 1987) . However, the filing of a docketing 
statement is not "jurisdictional". Dismissal of an appeal for 
failure to timely file a docketing statement is discretionary as 
the word "may" indicates. 
At the time this Court inquired about the status of 
defendant's appeal and the filing of a docketing statement, 
defendant had pending a motion to set aside the January 7 
Judgment as having been prematurely entered. Additionally, an 
Amended Judgment had been filed by plaintiff and mailed to the 
Court. Thus, it is completely understandable that no docketing 
statement was filed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment signed by Judge Young on January 5 and entered 
by the Third District Clerk on January 7, 1993, must be deemed, 
as a matter of law, to have not been "filed" or "entered". Under 
Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the Judgment 
should not have been presented to the Court for a signature at 
all, because plaintiff's counsel had been timely notified of 
objections to the form of the judgment. More importantly, the 
Judgment could not have been properly presented to the Court for 
signature until January 8, 1993, even if objections had not been 
filed. 
The only final judgment that has been properly filed and 
entered is the Amended Judgment dated January 27, 1993. 
Appellate's Notice of Appeal is, therefore, timely. 
Even if plaintiff's argument was correct and the January 7, 
1993, Judgment was the only final order, appellant's December 21, 
1992, Notice of Appeal would be timely. It would be deemed to 
have been filed on the day of entry of the final judgment, 
January 7, 1993, pursuant to Rule 4(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition is without merit 
and should be denied. 
Dated this rX day of April, 1993^ 
WILLIAMS 8c H" 
r 
By AA^ 
DENNIS C. FERGUSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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State of Utah ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Dennis C. Ferguson, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am counsel for defendant/appellant in this matter. 
2 . Attached to this Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition are true and correct 
copies of correspondence received by me from Daniel Darger and 
copies of correspondence sent by me to Daniel Darger. 
3 . I had no knowledge that the trial court had signed 
plaintiff's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment on January 5 and entered said pleadings on January 7, 
1993, until I spoke with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District 
Court on January 20, 1993. 
1993. 
DENN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me thisry dayvof April, 
Notary Public , 
HEATHER BARNEY ! 
1231 Warnock Avenue I 
'tL-ka City, Utah 84106 : 
• \-amission Expires * 
:ii 19. 1995 i 
.-to of Utah 5 
c J 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of ah 
19701 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Heather Barney, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant 
herein; that she served the VERIFIED MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION in Case No. 920599 
before the Utah Supreme Court upon the parties listed below by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to: 
Daniel D. Darger 
32 Exchange Place, Suite #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Parker M. Nielson 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Harold G. Christensen 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 . 
and causing the same to be mailed, postage prepaid, on the c>c 
day of April, 1993. 
Heather-^Barney 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /-P day^bf April, 
1993. 
i ^ S ™ ^ J ^ N o ^ r T p u b l i c 
//^M//^ 
'A 257E««200South S500 | 
. . ««., r^mm ssion Exo:rc3 • *y Commissi  pires J 
JUV30.J994 1 
S»ta ol Utah | 
Residing in the State of Utah 
#19454* ^wi?*^ S * 8 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 






Case No. 9003000302 and 
9103000249 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on October 21 and 22, 1992. The 
jury was waived, the court considered all remaining issues of fact and law presented by 
counsel at trial. The plaintiff was present and represented both pro se as an attorney and 
member of the bar and by his attorney, Daniel Darger. The defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney, Dennis C. Furgeson. The court heard the testimony of the 
witnesses as presented, received the evidence introduced both documentary and testimonial 
and further heard the arguments of counsel and based on the foregoing renders its 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. This action arose through the conduct of the defendant on or about 
September 8, 1990, wherein the defendant forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes 
referred to by the defendant as a "trap," forcefully disturbed the enclosed nature of the pen, 
tipped ii on its side, dismantled ceriain parts and took certain private property that was 
located there without ihc consent of the owner. 
2. At the time the defendant engaged in such conduct, he knew or should 
have known that the pen was being used or could have been used in connection with 
appropriate sport dog which training had been conducted at that location for some years 
prior. The defendant knew or should have known that the property was that of Parker 
Nielson, the plaintiff in this action. 
3. The court finds that the defendant knew of the activities of dog 
trainers in that area, both in training their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that the 
defendant had openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike for their 
activities. Further, the defendant knew or should have been chargeable with the duty to 
know that his predetermined opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement 
peace officer and that those individuals engaged in that aspect of sport training were fully 
authorized to engage in such and the defendant's conduct in complicating their activities was 
an inappropriate predilection and bias from which the defendant should have refrained. The 
court finds that it is not illegal to own, posses, or operate a bird pen equipped with recapture 
cones nor is it illegal for a person to "take" any bird held in private ownership lawfully by 
means of a recapture cone or pen. 
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4. The court recognizes that it could occur that wild game could be so 
captured and the pen owner would be obligated to release such "wild" game or unbanded 
game when so captured. However, the testimony of the witnesses showed that there was 
not expected to be any "chucker/partridge" wild game in this area and the defendant's own 
testimony was that he had not seen any in this area but had seen some at approximately five 
miles distance. 
5. The court finds that the defendant did act with malice, both in his 
general views of the dog training activity and in particular to Mr. Nielson, whom he knew 
or should have known, had an appropriate leasehold interest and the right to retake banded 
birds purchased from a private grower and used in training. 
6. The court further finds that the defendant went beyond his appropriate 
duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by contacting the United States Forest Service and 
the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry and their officials in seeking to have those 
government agencies investigate the activities of the plaintiff and create problems for the 
plaintiff in conducting his appropriate and lawful activities. 
7. The court finds that the defendant specifically attempted to diminish 
the relationship of the plaintiff and others interested in dog training with the United States 
Forest Service by taking Forest Service officials to the plaintiffs leased premises and in 
attempting to persuade those officials that the plaintiff was trespassing on Forest Service 
land and was conducting unlawful activities thereon. 
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8. The court finds that the defendant's conduct was beyond the scope of 
his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted. 
9. The court finds the defendant's conduct was wrongful and constituted 
an effort to disregard the proclamations of the Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis 
upon which the court could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual basis to 
enjoin the defendant individually from such conduct both in relation to the plaintiffs 
leasehold land interest and in relation to others similarly engaged in lawful activities 
throughout the state. 
10. The court finds that the evidence established at trial shows that the 
defendant acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless way in disregard of the rights 
of the plaintiff and his leasehold interest in the land in question. The court notes that the 
uncontroverted evidence is that land useful for dog training of the type and description 
herein is difficult to find, difficult to value, and difficult to effectively utilize for the purpose 
of dog training because substantial acreage, upwards of the range of six square miles, is 
ideally necessary for this kind of activity. This location is one of the very few potential 
sites available to dog trainers in the state of Utah. 
11. The court finds that since the underlying ground leasehold interest 
remains intact and there is no present indication that it will not be renewed, that no 
damages should be assessed for the interference with the leasehold activities as a result of 
the destruction of the pen. 
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12. The court finds that the supervisors of the defendant in the Division of 
Wildlife Resources knew or should have known of the defendant's dislike for the activities 
of the plaintiff and others engaged in similar dog training activities and that they should 
have appropriately disciplined the defendant prior to the desiruciion by the defendant of the 
plaintiffs pen. In addition, the defendant's supervisor should have readily acknowledged 
the defendant's misconduct and affirmatively tried in limit the defendant and should have 
sought to remedy the situation with the plaintiff. 
13. The couri finds that the defendant's claim that the pen was a "trap" 
under the law is not supported by the evidence and the defendant has failed to meet his 
burden of proof in so establishing. The court finds that ihere were several indicators that 
this was an appropriate recapture pen that were known or should have been known to the 
defendant. They include but are not limited to the following: 
a. The pen was on land known used for upland game dog training 
by Parker Niclson and others and should have caused the defendant to be 
aware that recapture pens could be placed thereon. 
b. Ai the site of the pen, their were bands used for banding 
properly purchased birds and though it may be argued by the defendant that 
those bands could be placed on wild game so captured, the defendant should 
have recalled that no wild "chucker/partridge" had been sighted in that area 
by him and that before destroying the property, he at least could have taken 
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the band numbers and inquired whether those bands had been appropriately 
sold to a licensed "chucker/pariridgc" bird owner. 
c. The recapture cones arc designed to recapture, without injury, 
training birds and lhat should have given the defendant an obvious indication 
that the pen could be their for a lawful purpose. 
14, The defendant had multiple indicators that the pen was there for a 
lawful purpose and could have at least, without offensively, knocking it down, releasing the 
birds contained therein and destroying the pen, made appropriate inquiries as to who the 
owner might be, as to whose land it might be positioned on, and whether the pen could have 
been placed there for a lawful purpose. 
15. The court further finds that the defendant has in the conduct of the 
defense intentionally filed a false affidavit with the court and has intentionally taken a 
defensive posture that was inappropriate under the circumstances in that the defendant or the 
Division of Wildlife Resources should have readily offered to remove the defendant from 
further enforcement activities on this property knowing full well that the defendant 
maintained continuing hostility toward the plaintiff and his activities. 
Based upon the foregoing, the court makes its 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991, is 
affirmed herein. 
2. That the ownership, possession, and operation of the bird pens for 
domestic birds properly equipped with recapture cones or devices is a lawful and proper use 
under the laws of the state of Utah. 
3. Peace officers, including conservation officers such as the defendant 
are prohibited from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by the plaintiff. 
4. The defendant in this case may not be heard to claim that the 
plaintiffs pen was there for the intended capture of "wild" birds as it was being used 
appropriately and within legal rights. 
5. The court finds that the damages to the pen and the replacement costs 
assessed in damages to the defendant arc $2,300.(X). 
6. The court finds tl^t the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's f^s under 
§ 78-27-56 of * \S; DDd . — t ^ / j 
7. The court finds that it is appropriate to issue a permanent injunction 
against this individual defendant from further activities on the plaintiffs leasehold land in 
relation to Wildlife Management activities. This is not inconsistent with the defendant's 
duties under the circumstances since the defendant has been transferred to Cedar City, and 
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should thus have no objection to avoiding any future confrontation associated with the 
plaintiff and the land in question. 
8. The court declines to grant further punitive damages. The plaintiff is 
awarded damages and fees as stated herein and costs incurred herein. 
DATED this JJL day of > g t ^ K ^ ^ » ^ 1992. 
5AVID S. YOUNG 
District CouaJ*Klge 
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DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061) 
JODY K BURNETT (A04 99) 
WILLIAMS Sc HUNT 
2 5 7 E a s t 200 S o u t h , S u i t e 500 
P o s t O f f i c e Box 4 5 6 7 8 
S a l t L a k e C i u y , U t a h 8 4 1 4 5 - 5 6 7 8 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 5 6 7 8 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, : 
: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
: Civil No. 90-0300-302 
DALE GURLEY, : and 
: Civil No. 91-0300-249 
Defendant. 
Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant Dale 
Gurley through counsel, Dennis* C. Ferguson of the law firm of 
Williams & Hunt appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final 
judgment of the Honorable David S. Young entered in this matter 
on December 18, 1992. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment entered on 
December 18, 1992, as well as from all prior judgments entered in 
favor of plaintiff, including without limitation Partial Summary 
Judgment, entered in favor of plaintiff on June 24, 1991, as well 
as the Order of Judge Moffat entered on January 31, 1992, 
purporting to grant plaintiff an award of attorneys' fees as a 
sanction. Appeal is also taken from the trial court's denial of 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Motion for Relief from Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Relief from Order. 
DATED this ^A day of December, 1992. 
WILl/lAMS & HUNT 
by_4 k/lA^A Dennis C. Ferguson 
At to rneys fo r De 
#17669 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Heather Barney, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant 
herein; that she served the attached Notice of Appeal in Civil 
Nos. 90-0300-302 and 91-0300-249 before the Third District Court 
for Tooele County, upon the parties listed below by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Daniel D. Darger 
32 Exchange Place, Suite #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Parker M. Nielson 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing the same to- be mailed, postage prepaid, on the 
day of December, 1992. 
St 
leather Barzifey 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this day of 
December, 1992. 
Notary Public 
A X ^ v * - x \ r A ERIKC HACKING 
/-"'Ajr^^aYA 257 East 200 South # 5C; 
r f i ^ j l ' / - ' Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
V - • • : / _~ My Commission Expire". 
"1 
a te of Utah 
#72705. 
August 28, 19SD 
StHtecf 0:*h 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
25" EAST 200 SOUTH SUITE 500 
P O BOX 456~8 
SALT LAKE CI TV UTAH 841 45-5678 
DENNIS C FERGUSON 
December 24, 1992 
rELEPHONE'801- 5 : i - 5 f 
FAX -801 ' 3b4-45._ 
Daniel Darger, Esq. 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Nielson v Gurley 
Civil No. 900 300 302 
Dear Dan: 
Thank you for sending me a copy of the proposed Judgment. There are two 
areas that I think should be clarified in the Judgment. First, with regard to paragraph 
3, I think the Judgment should reflect the Judge's opinion that plaintiff has not 
suffered any damage as a result of the interference with contract. Second, in 
paragraph 4, I think it should reflect that the $2,300 reflects the amount which the 
Court found as the replacement cost for the pen and its contents. I would appreciate it 
if you would make these changes and forward a copy of the Judgment with these 
modifications to me for approval. Please let me know if you disagree with my 
opinion that these items should be included so that I may make formal objections if 
necessary. Thank you. 
Very truly yours, 
ILUAMS & HUNT 
fs C. Ferguson 
DCF:hb 
cc: Parker M. Nielson 
James R. Soper 
1347; 
GENERAL PRACTICE WITH DANIEL DARGER TELEPHONE 
LITIGATION EMPHASIS ATTORNEY VT LAW (S0H5M-6686 
100 t 'ALMFRCIAL CLLB BULDING FAX 
*2 EXCHANGE PLACE (801 i531-6690 
SALT LAKE CITY LTAH 84111 
December 22, 1992 
Dennis Ferguson 
Jody Burnett 
Williams & Hunt 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
RE: Nielson v. Gurley, et al 
Civil No. 900 300 302 
Dear Dennis: 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504. C.J.A., I am hereby serving upon you our proposed Judgment 
regarding the above. I expect that if you have objections, you will make them within five 
days as provided by the Rule. 
In the event that I do not receive your objections within five days, I will submit this 
Judgment to the Court for entry. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Very truly yours. 
DD/kl 
cc: Parker Nielson 
Enclosure 
P-3dft.pri 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 







David S. Young 
The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21 
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its 
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992, 
NOW, THEREFORE, based thereon the Court makes and enters the 
following 
J U D G M E N T 
1. The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991, 
is affirmed and adopted herein. 
2. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion. 
3. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract. 
4. Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in 
the amount of $2,3 00.00 
5. Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting 
in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from 
further wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold 
lands situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or 
indirectly, described as follows: 
Township 9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M 
Section 15: SW4, W2SE4 
Section 16: SE4 
Section 22: N2NW4 
6. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys7 fees in the amount of 
$15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
ENTERED this day of December, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
(0633N) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT 
has been mailed, postage prepaid to Dennis Ferguson/Jody Burnett, P.O. Box 45678, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84145-5678, this *"LL day of ^ Y U . 1992. 
P5mot.pri 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






CASE NUMBER 900300302 PD 
DATE 12/18/92 
HONORABLE YOUNG, DAVID S. 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. DARGER, DANIEL 
D. ATTY. FERGUSON, DENNIS C 
THE COURT THIS DATE ENTERED ITS MEMORANDUM DECISION IN THIS 
MATTER. THE PLAINTIFF IS REQUESTED TO PREPARE CONSISTENT WITH 
THE MEMORANDUM DECISION AND THE RECORD, FORMAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND A JUDGMENT. THE FUNDS PREVIOUSLY 
RELEASED ARE INTENDED TO FORM A PART OF THE TOTAL RECOVERY. 
THIS JUDGE WILL RETAIN JURISDICTION OVER THIS MATTER UNTIL 
THE FINAL DOCUMENTS RESOLVING THE CASE ARE IN PLACE. COUNSEL 
ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE COURTESY COPIES OF THEIR PLEADINGS TO 
THE COURT THROUGH DELIVERY IN SALT LAKE CITY. ANY HEARING 
REQUESTED TO CONSIDER THE FINAL LANGUAGE WILL BE SET IN SALT 
LAKE. 
C.C. TO COUNSEL 
GENERAL PRACTICE WITH 
LITIGATION' EMPHASIS 
DANIEL DARGER 
ATTORNEY \T LAW 
100 COMMERCIAL CLL'B BUILDING 
^2 EXCHANGE PLACE 









Williams & Hunt 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
RE: Nielson v. Gurley. et al 
Civil No. 900 300 302 
Dear Dennis: 
Thank you for the clarifications set out in your letter of December 24, 1992. 
However, since I served our previous proposed judgment. Judge Young has ordered that 
findings of fact be prepared. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 4-504, C.J.A., I am hereby serving 
upon you our proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment regarding the 
above. I expect that if you have objections, you will make them within five days as provided 
by the Rule. In the event that I do not receive your objections within five days, I will submit 
this Judgment to the Court for entry. 
I believe the clarifications set forth in your letter of the 24th are taken care of in the 
findings. If you have other suggestions, please contact me. 
As you know, a final judgment has not yet been entered in this case. Therefore, your 
notice of appeal is premature and untimely. I suggest that we agree that it will be treated as 
having been filed the day after a final judgment has been entered and notify Goeff Butler of 
this fact so that he can calendar the appeal accordingly. This will avoid the necessity of a 
motion to dismiss your appeal. 
Thanks for the great party. Happy New Year! 
Yery truly your 
DD/d 




Attorney at Law 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil Nos. 90-0300-302 
) 91-0300-249 
Judge David S. Young 
The court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, and the Defendant having waived jury trial and 
having tried the issues remaining on October 21 and 22, 1992, 
sitting without a jury, the Defendant being present in person and 
represented by his counsel, Dennis C, Ferguson, Esq., and the 
Plaintiff being present in person and represented by his counsel, 
Daniel Darger, Esq., and the parties having presented evidence, 
both documentary and testimonial, and the court being fully 
advised in the premises, and having entered its Memorandum 
Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having directed the 
Plaintiff to prepare formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Judgment consistent therewith by Minute Entry dated 
December 18, 1992. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This action arose through the conduct of Defendant, Dale 
Gurley ("Gurley" herein), admitted by Gurley in his Answers to 
Interrogatories, his Affidavit herein, his Investigative Report 
and his trial testimony, wherein on September 8, 1990, Gurley 
forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes referred to by 
Gurley as a "trap," forcefully disturbed the enclosed nature of 
the pen, tipped it on its side, dismantled certain parts and took 
certain private property located there without the consent of the 
owner. 
2. At the time Gurley engaged in such conduct he knew, or 
should have known, that the pen was used or could have been used 
in connection with appropriate sporting dog training, and that 
such training had been conducted at that location for a period of 
years previously, and knew or should have known that the property 
was that of Plaintiff. 
3. The court finds that Gurley knew of the activities of dog 
trainers in the area where the pen was located, both in training 
their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that Gurley had 
openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike 
for their activities. The court finds, further, that Gurley knew 
or was chargeable with duty to know that his predetermined 
opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement peace 
officer, including because of the matters found as facts at 
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7. The court finds that Gurley went beyond his appropriate 
duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by contacting the United 
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry, 
and their officials, in seeking to have those government agencies 
investigate Plaintiff and create problems for the Plaintiff in 
conducting his appropriate and lawful activities. 
8. The court finds that Gurley specifically attempted to 
diminish the relationship of the plaintiff and others interested 
in dog training with the United States Forest Service by taking 
Forest Service officials to Plaintiff's leased premises and 
attempting to persuade those officials that Plaintiff was 
trespassing on forest land and was conducting unlawful activities 
thereon. 
9. The court finds that Gurley7s conduct was beyond the scope 
of his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted. 
10. The court finds that Gurley's conduct was wrongful and 
constituted an effort to disregard the proclamations of the 
Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis upon which the court 
could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual 
basis to enjoin Gurley individually from such conduct, both in 
relation to Plaintiff's leasehold land in the vicinity of Vernon, 
Utah, and in relation to any persons engaged in lawful dog 
training activities elsewhere in the State of Utah. 
11. The court finds that the evidence established at trial 
that Gurley acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless 
way in disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and his leasehold 
interest in the land in question. The court finds that the 
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wh 1 \ h d i e so bu i I i b l e 
1J. Th*a cou r t f i n d s t h a t s i n c e P l a i n t i f f ' s u n d e r l y i n g 
J e a s e h n l d [nnnniii1 Mil n I iiull l i m n 1 11 iilmn ( nl 1 pi enunt 
i n d i c a t i o n 1 hat iI w i l l n o t be renewed, no damages s h o u l d be 
a s s e s s e d fo r G m i n y ' s i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h P l a i n t i f f s l easphoLd 
nci 1 i f \ pr- f i* MI It 1 ii«
 f ' I I ' M 'i " n n t » u I , " 1 i 1 n l 1 t I " . n i n . 
I i l he c o m I f i n d s i h n t t h e s u p e r v i s o r s of Gur i ey i n t h e 
D i v i s i o n ot W i l d l i f e R e s o u r c e s knew o r s h o u l d have known .»! 
OUT lb »y "« d 1e I 1 I* * I 111 I 111 11 cI 1 v in I 11 •« n I II' 1 J j nI i I 1 a 1 id o t h e r s 
engaged i n s i m i J a i doq t r a i n i n q a c t i v i t i e s and t h a t t hey s h o u l d 
have a p p r o p r i a t e l y d i s c i p l i n e d Gur i ey pi 101 In t h e de r fmnr t 1 mn by 
1 in Ins n I ll'J 1 Jilt i l l 'n 1 H.J J 1, Ilii 1 nmil I n i i h c i i i n d o t h a t Lho 
s u p e r v i s o r ^ 01 G u r i e y 111 Mm D i v i s i o n of W i l d l i f e P^aonrc. e s s h o u l d 
'i.ivp r e a d i l y acknnw 1 edqed Gin l ey ' z\ mi s c e n d n e t n nl \ f t" i 1 ITM */\ ^ P\ y 
m.s'1 r n 11 1 nun If, iini Miinjli! 1 eiiicd^ t IHJ e i L t i c t s u i i.!ur L e y ' s 
misconduct with Plaintiff, 
II 4 Thn cour t f I nds t h a t Cur l oy ' 1 I 1 1111 I h 11 !' I 1 j unit 1 ft * II11 r 1I 
b'.'i .J i' «ii H i up mi » not s u p p o r t e d by the e v i d e n c e and G u r i e y h a s 
failed to meet bin burden of piuoi that the pen was used as a 
"trap" or with the intent to "take" any "protected wildlife." 
15. The court finds that there were several indicators that 
Plaintiff's recapture pen was appropriate and lawful which were 
known or should have been known to Gurley, including but not 
limited to the following: 
a. The pen was on land Gurley knew was used for upland 
game dog training by Plaintiff and others, and Gurley knew or 
should have been aware that recapture pens could properly be 
placed thereon. 
b. Bands used for banding live game birds, lawfully 
acquired, when used for dog training were found by Gurley at 
the site of the pen. 
c. Despite Gurley's arguments that the bands could be 
placed on wild birds, which were not lawfully acquired, Gurley 
knew or should have recalled that no wild Chukar Partridge had 
been seen by him in the area where the pen was located. 
d. Gurley should have inquired, before destroying 
Plaintiff's property, if the bands had been sold by or to a 
licensed Chukar Partridge owner for appropriate use in dog 
training. 
/e,. Gurley knew, or should have known, and could have 
observed that the recapture cones are designed to recapture 
training birds without injury and it should therefore have 
been obvious to him that the pen was-maiivfeairied for a proper 
purpose. 
\<\ 16. Gurley had multiple indicators that Plaintiff's pen was 
there for a lawful purpose and was obligated, including for the 
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reasons determined rn the Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
J u n e .M I" I! „ iiiiliiiin lhi ( i ind i iHi ' i i i i i 1 r e a f f i nued i i in l iii l op l ed hi r p i n 'by 
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.land i t JTI i c) I»t be s i t u a t e d on enid whethei t h e pen was Hiere foi a 
l a w f u l p u r p o s e , 
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.111. The euni I 1 loi'thei d e t e r m i n e s t h a t t h e l a ck of m e r i t and 
bad f a i t h ol C u r . l e y ' s d e f e n s e i n c l u d e s t h a t Hur ley or Hie i n v i s i o n 
if I1! i I 11 1 1 ( ( Ueoo'i I i'i :«•••'•. dlid lie. I ' 0 | I IV . . I JM u 1I ve , lie hidiinj Lliteir 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h e r e i n , s h o u l d have r e a d i l y o f f e r e d t o remove 
Gurley from f u r t h e r e n f o r c e m e n t a c t i v i t i e s on P l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y ' 
1. n-.win.| [ I-. 1 I 'rt. II 'III.il uhiil . ' j li<u hoi i ii enL.i mil nq h o s t i l i t y toward 
P l a i n t i f f and dot) t r a i n i n c ) a c t i v i t i e s . 
NOW, THEREFORE, t h e c o u r t m a k e s anil omt « i , t I'M fi ill 1 i o'i i | 
CONCLUSIONS OF I.AVI: 
1* Tim tMr*: ML SUIIIIIM i \ .im lament h e r e i n d a t e d J u n e 24 1,9^1 , 
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 r I, awl u l 1 y acqu i r e d , e q u i p p e d w i t h r e c a p t u r e c o n e s 
o r d e v i c e s , ,is l awfu l and p r o p e r u n d e r t h e p i o v i s i o n s of Utah Code 
Ann, 'ii iM- I • ;'" .in Il III .illi Mini n i st tat" j» <> CmJp t| OUH-'I" J 
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3. Peace officers, including Conservation Officers such as 
Defendant, are prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
23-20-15 from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by 
Plaintiff. 
4. Defendant may not contend that Plaintiff's recapture pen 
was there for or intended to capture "wild" birds as it was being 
used appropriately and within legal rights. 
5. The court determines that the facts establish the elements 
of conversion. 
6. The court determines that the facts establish the elements 
of interference with a contract, consisting of Plaintiff's lease 
agreement with the State of Utah. 
7. The court finds that the damages to the pen and 
replacement costs assessed in damages to the Defendant are 
$2,300.00. 
8. The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 of $15,000.00. 
9. The court finds and determines that the damages resulting 
from Defendant's interference with Plaintiff's contract rights are 
difficult or impossible to determine, including because 
Plaintiff's lease and the uses to which it was being put are 
unique, have no market value and cannot be compensated for in 
money damages, within the meaning and intent of System Concepts, 
Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983), and that 
Defendant's wrongs are of a continuing character, the nature, 
extent and value of which can be estimated only by conjecture, and 
that the acts of Defendant are continuing or are threatened to 
8 
c o n t i n u e , and th . i t t h e r e i s a need t o o n j o i n -and r e s t r a i n 
Defendan t Drilc G u r l e y , ind i.v :i di.ni 1 i y , mid an\ i n n . n i h nM iimi in 
cum ,.,'wi L on p ill t in' jpal ion « i" i I In In i in I i ' mi I ui tin i a c t i v i t i e s n n 
r e l a t i o n tc W i l d l i f e Management on P l a i n t i f f ' s l e a s e h o l d l and i n 
t h e v i c i n i t y of ^ Vernon, Utah , o r from n t tempi inn t iliiii in I I I in"! 
11-1 HIt,,l onsh j | ;.»I I"" 1 ct J ui;,. J.,1,I' diid oLIiors J iii e r e s L e d i n lo^ L r a i i i i n g , 
i n c l u d i n g by a t t e m p t i n g t o p e r s u a d e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s F o r e s t 
S e r v i c e and t h e Utah D i v i s i o n of i ind md ^ ' opt i \\\,\\ HUM c 
a c t in v J tiein 'in („ 1 1 mi in I <ii u I HI II The count l ui tiier I inds that such an 
injunction is nol inconsistent with Defendant's duties undoi the 
circumstances, since the oi 'ideno* iiidii ifnl Mi.it iiin U y Ihi.iili lu'csn 
tii'ansl: erred t j Ci, dai City and thun shou Id lid .'e no objection to 
avoiding future confrontation with Pla int i f f , doy t i a ine r s or the 
land which i s the sub j ect q f tl :i I s siij t: , 
] 0 P1 a i nt i f f 1s awarded f e e s as s t ated here i i i, and c o s t s 
i ncurred herein 
ENTER ED t In :i s day ::).:£ Decembei , ] 9 9 2 . 
BY THE COURT: 
D A V I E T ^ T - F O U N G - ' — — — — — — — -
'^  . s t r i c t C'./urt J udge? 
(I Ihf.'j, ;iM), 
I 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT' COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
DALE GURLEY, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i JUDGMENT 
i Civil Nos. 90-0300-302 
i 91-0300-249 
i Judge David S. Young 
The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21 
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its 
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having entered 
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based thereon 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court makes and enters the following 
J U D G M E N T 
1. The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991, 
is affirmed and adopted herein. 
2. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion. 
3 Judgment is granted in favot of Plaintiff and aqainst 
Defend !•"•*' i jb'j.ci fill "i i hiim ni iiil.ei 1 ei't'iin tj wil, hi ii <.:t nil r act 
4 Damages are awacued lo Plaintiff and against Defendant in 
the amount of $2 IOC 00 
5 . Defendant Da 1n (1m: I ny , i iid i \, i dual ,1 y , mi I uny pvi sun a :ting 
:i i 'ijii'icei't, DI" pa it icipation with hiw, is permanently enjoined! from 
diminishing or interfering with, or attempting to diminish or 
interfere w i *• h I li" i n 1 i:i,f" ionsh i p of I'l -,t i lit ;i f I; ,ni'l "dl IKT*± interested 
i" 'i'>',) t.L'-j i nin'i, including by attempting to persuade the United 
States Forest Service and the Utah I")ivision of Lands and Forestry 
that their act.ivit i r-s ai"i;'' uiiliU ill 11 I i • muliu'l iritj Jut l.hei 
wi l.'iil i fe management activities on P l a i n t i f f s leasehold lands 
situated in Tooe.Ie County, State of Utah, either direct! v i 
indirect 1 ,/
 f desc: : i be , :i as fo2 1 c ws: 
Township 9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M 
Section 15* SV?-\ W2SE4 
Section it I 
Section ?; *. -
a. P l a i n t i f f i s a w a r d e d a"* myt * <on« ' *'n UII M I >' 
$ "I ' J111 " " t1 | » ,". i i. , mi., o l Ut all ,,'ode Ann, h 78-2 7 - 5 6 . 
ENTERED this _ day of December, 1992. 
BY THE w 
D i s t r i ot' Court J ml no 
(0633N) 
GENERAL PRACTICE WITH DANIEL DARGER 
LITIGATION EMPHASIS ATTORNEY AT LAW 
100 COMMERCIAL CLL'B BUILDLNG 
32 EXCHANGE PLACE 
SALT LAKE CITY. LTAH 8411 i 
December 30, 1992 
HAND DELIVERED 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Third District Judge 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
RE: Nielson v. Gurley 
Civil No. 900300302 and PD910300249 PD 
Dear Judge Young: 
Enclosed are our findings and conclusions and form of judgment, pursuant to your 
minute entry dated December 18, 1992. 
We have attempted to conform the language in the findings and conclusions to your 
Memorandum Decision of December 18, 1992 as nearly as possible, adding only those 
matters necessary to implement the decision which are fairly implied. For your convenience, 
and for the convenience of counsel, those additions consist of the appropriate language of an 
injunction in paragraph 9 of the conclusions of law and judgment, viz., inadequacy o the legal 
remedy and prohibiting action in "concert or participation" with Gurley, individually. We felt 
that while this is the effect of an injunction, even if not stated, it should be made explicit so 
that the person enjoined is on notice of its effect. 
We have also added conclusions of law at paragraphs 5 and 6, which appear to fairly 
implied and necessary to indicate what claims have been decided. Finding of fact number 14 
is in the language of the Court, but broken into five subparagraphs. We have added reference 
to the definition of "take" or "trapping" in finding of fact number 5, which seemed necessary 
to conform to the evidence and complete the thought expressed by the Court. There may be 
other word changes, and some paragraphs may have been divided into two findings, but no 





We will appreciate -: > o^> u:., (! »; . . i .^ niiuui^- ,oiKi .-.l^ib J . . . j , ^ ^ . ; ut after 
Mi Ferguson has an oppi nunii) lu present any objections Ir m:i\ u • .* 
Enclosures 
ec Parker Nielsen, Esq. 
P' ~nis C Ferguson, Esq.. 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH , SUITE 500 
P O. BOX 45678 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5678 
ENNIS C FERGUSON 
January 7, 1993 
Daniel Darger, Esq. Hand Delivered 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Nielson v Gurlev, Civil No. 900 300 302 
Form of Judgment, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Dear Dan: 
I was out of town on vacation from December 28 through January 5, 1993. On 
my return to the office on January 6, 1993, I reviewed your correspondence of 
December 30 and the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment which you enclosed therewith. 
With regard to the Judgment, I reiterate my clarifications set forth in my letter 
of December 24. I believe the Judgment itself should make clear that the damages are 
awarded for the damage to the pen and that there have been no additional damages 
arising out of the interference with contract. 
With regard to your proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, I have 
the following objections. References are made to the paragraph numbers in the 
proposed Findings: 
4. This paragraph was not a part of Judge Young's Memorandum Decision. 
While the legal conclusion set forth therein my be extrapolated from the Memorandum 
Decision or from prior rulings, it is my view that the Findings should be restricted to 
those actually determined by the Court as set forth in the Memorandum Decision. 
13. The last sentence of paragraph 13 states "the Court further finds that the 
supervisors of Gurley". . . . Judge Young's Memorandum Decision (1f 12) refers to 
"defendant's supervisor should have readily acknowledged. . . . " The Court was 
clearly referring to Officer Gurley's immediate supervisor and not "supervisors" as a 
group. This can be corrected by simply adopting the precise language from paragraph 
12 of the Court's Memorandum Decision. 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678 
FAX (801) 364-4500 
Daniel Darker. Hsu. 2 - Janiia, 
15.e The language "was maintained" should V s h<- iged to '\i».W: •-, me;\ j 
conform with the language used by the Court in paragraph ; i A d d i t i o n d U d i e 
w o r d ' " p r o p e r " s h o u l d "~ '' •'••-•••'•-'• . * .1 4 , > \ r * •: • : * " . . ! • > l a n g u a g e 
'I a-u'
 #J , t • '''<
s
 Liriguagt paraLupn^ . -,... 1" J . I X , . . . e 
deleted and ' u :xact language IMMP paragraph 15 substituted The language which 
you hi\y c chose1; is ;u Mi<n..-h Oilt'eiew to i.iiiM1 rnt ''once u th.: ioes rvl reflect 
the ( oun 's Inkles he Couii spi\ i fuall\ lound w ,u Officer Gurle\ lour a 
"'defensive posture" that was inappropriate based upon the Imding that he . 
Division of Wildlife Resources should have readily offered to remove the ck 
from further enforcement activities on this property. The language proposcu 
seems to imply that there other items. The Court's findings, however ar** «^- dl d'v 
limited to this one criticism. 
vVivi, ICL.UO -.o Liit CuiiLiu.Mons of Law. v~\:~ -roposcd paiagraph 9 '- fuund 
» in the Court'* Conclusions of I aw I suggest that paragraph 9 of vour 
, , , . , . .,ed conclusions be dele:ed and that the exact language from paragraph 7 o+ s ^ 
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of the Memorandum i eiMor slating " . '• "ov Coun :eciim^ ;o gram firth " * o r ve 
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prema are It v* :s difficult tar me to determine from the Memorandum Decision 
u h e n n the Cmri intended operate as the Findir-j^ ot L ict. Conclusion> of Lu . 
• a ':,dement hereh u \ C U M .>: i:.< . * >t .^a .>n ane r;ied a Notice ^f Appeal. 
Subsequently, die Com e n n e d a Minute l-.n; \ icqi: ing tf: the plamtilf pie; aie 
findings and cimclusions and a judgment, making it e .;ar tha *:ir Memoianc:in. 
Decision was not intended by the Court to corstitute ":e judgment -a ir,. \ ew ko!c 
4(c), I :tah Ruh> of Appellate Procedure speaks to ur nrore^iu-al issue stating tha: a 
notice oi appeal filed after the announcement of a d> a<v »
 r! - » .- * r C j e r ^ H t 
Daniel Darger, Esq. - 3 - January 7, 1993 
before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed 
after such entry and on the day thereof. At any rate, I think we can take care of this 
procedural glitch without difficulty. 
I look forward to hearing from you soon with regard to the proposed language 
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. Thank you for your 
courtesy. 
Very truly yours, 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
DCF:hb 
cc: Parker M. Nielson 
James R. Soper 
Dale Gurley 
13473 
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hll.LIAMS !> HUNT 
Attorneys ^t ! -" 
257 East 20C , 
P.O. Box 4 5 67*-
Salt V-> ir 
.ei: 
Plaintiff and App e 1 1 o <* 




Dear Mr. Burnett : 
The record in the above-referenced case was due 
January 7, 1993, and has not been filed. We do not have notice 
from you that a transcript has been ordered and paid for in 
accordance with Rule'11(e)(1) and (4), of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Proced-:^ . nor do we have noti ce that the transcript 
u . ,; requ I re- * 
1! ... ..\'. joir^ -i, •,.; w'ai.i lac luuH- siatea rule, would 
you kindly ..end his office a copy of trie written request for 
transcript or notice that the transcript is ot required which 
will cleaK ^ i.-^ .-o")- i" +-hir imt'-r-
Lr.^ess .uio deiduii is taken care of within ten days 





LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
A, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
257 EAST 200 SOUTH . SUITE 500 
P.O. BOX 45678 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841 45-5678 
>ENNIS C. FERGUSON 
January 20, 1993 
Geoffrey J. Butler Hand Delivered 
Supreme Court Clerk 
State of Utah 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Nielson v. Gurley 
Civil Nos. 920599 and 900300302 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Thank you for your letter of January 13, 1993, and for discussing with me 
today the status of the Notice of Appeal which I filed on behalf of Dale Gurley. I 
want to briefly review the procedural status of this case, which will serve to explain 
why we have not proceeded further at this time with the filing of a docketing 
statement. 
On December 18, 1992, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision, a 
copy of which I attach hereto. At the time I received the Memorandum Decision I 
could not ascertain from the pleading itself whether the Court intended it to constitute 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. In order to protect my 
client's interest, I filed a Notice of Appeal on December 21, 1992. 
I filed the Notice of Appeal not only to comply with the thirty-day requirement 
but also because I filed at the same time a Motion for Supersedeas Relief, asking the 
trial court to stay execution on the judgment pending appeal. At the same time I filed 
the requisite security. 
After the Notice of Appeal was filed, Judge Young entered a Minute Entry 
directing that plaintiffs counsel prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
Judgment, submit these pleadings to me for approval and then to the Court for entry. 
Based upon the trial court's subsequent action, it is now clear that he did not intend 
his Memorandum Decision to constitute the final order in this matter. 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-5678 
FAX (801) 364-4500 
Geoffrey J. Butler • ? January 20, 1993 
lo date, the ti ial coui t has not entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusion s of 
Law and Judgment Thus, the order currently appealed from, is not final. 
As I read Rule 4 (c). I J tah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the notice of appeal in 
this case will be treated as filed after the entry of the Judgment "and on the day 
thereof". 
However, in the e\ ent that post-trial n lotions are filed pursuant to Rule 50( b), 
.Rule 52(b) or Rule 59, the current Notice of Appeal would have no effect. Rule 4(b) 
provides that "a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any [such] motions 
si lall have no effect" and requires a new notice of appeal to be filed "within the 
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of 
[such a] motion". 
Because a final judgment has not been entered and, theoretically at least, 
motions under Rules 50, 52 or 59 could be filed after entry of such judgment, it is 
i mpossible to know at this point whether the current Notice of Appeal will be effective 
under Rule 4(c) or whether a new notice of appeal will need to be filed as provided by 
Rule 4(b). For this reason, I respectfully ask that the Court hold this appeal \r 
abeyance until further action has been, taken by the trial coui t ' ••:' l -• - * • 
Supreme Court notified of the status of the case, 
If for any reasoi l you believe the procedure I have suggested is nnl appropriate, 
I would appreciate your so advisi ng. Thank you. 
Very truly yours, 
DCFihb 
enclosures 
cc: •.:. ;e^  I L«. ,vr 
Parkei V 
Unne< R ^ p< 
D^his J~a'uuv 
DANIEL DARGER (0815)
 0~ „ ' 
100 Commercial Club Building ->o ..;•.;. / -pTi l^« 2 5 
32 Exchange Place r,, r-n ..v 10y 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 ^ ' ^ ^ - f 1 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil Nos, 90-0300-302 
91-0300-249 
Judge David S. Young 
The court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, and the Defendant having waived jury trial and 
having tried the issues remaining on October 21 and 22, 1992, 
sitting without a jury, the Defendant being present in person and 
represented by his counsel, Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq-, and the 
Plaintiff being present in person and represented by his counsel, 
Daniel Darger, Esq«, and the parties having presented evidence, 
both documentary and testimonial, and the court being fully 
advised in the premises, and having entered its Memorandum 
Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having directed the 
Plaintiff to prepare formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Judgment consistent therewith by Minute Entry dated 
December 18, 1992* 
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This action arose through the conduct of Defendant, bale 
Gurley ("Gurley" herein), admitted by Gurley in his Answers to 
Interrogatories, his Affidavit herein, his Investigative Report 
and his trial testimony, wherein on September 8, 1990, Gurley 
forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes referred to by 
Gurley as a "trap," forcefully disturbed the enclosed nature of 
the pen, tipped it on its side, dismantled certain parts and took 
certain private property located there without the consent of the 
owner. 
2. At the time Gurley engaged in such conduct he knew, or 
should have known, that the pen was used or could have been used 
in connection with appropriate sporting dog training, and that 
such training had been conducted at that location for a period of 
years previously, and knew or should have known that the property 
was that of Plaintiff. 
3. The court finds that Gurley knew of the activities of dog 
trainers in the area where the pen was located, both in training 
their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that Gurley had 
openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike 
for their activities. The court finds, further, that Gurley knew 
or was chargeable with duty to know that his predetermined 
opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement peace 
officer, including because of the matters found as facts at 
2 
paragraphs D through F of the Partial Summary Judgment herein 
dated June 24, 1991, which findings are reaffirmed and adopted 
herein by reference thereto, and that persons engaged in the sport 
of dog training were fully authorized by law to do so and that 
Gurley's conduct in complicating their activities was an 
inappropriate predilection and bias from which Gurley should have 
refrained. 
4. The court finds that it is not illegal to own, possess, or 
operate a bird pen equipped with recapture cones or devices, nor 
is it illegal for a person to "take* any bird held in private 
ownership lawfully acquired by means of a recapture pen. 
5* The court recognizes that it could occur that wild game 
could become captured in a lawful device such as Plaintiff's pen 
and that the definitions of "take* and "trapping" in the Fish and 
Game code, their reference to "attempt[ing] any action" in 
particular would obligate the owner to release such "wild" game 
when so captured. However, the testimony of the witnesses 
established that there was no expectation that any wild Chukar 
Partridge would be in the area of Plaintiff's pen and Gurley's own 
testimony was that he had not seen any in the area of Plaintiff's 
pen but had seen some at approximately five miles distance. 
6. The court further finds that Gurley acted with malice, 
both in his general views of the dog training activity and in 
particular to Plaintiff, whom he knew or should have known had an 
appropriate leasehold interest and the right to retake game birds 
lawfully acquired from a private wildlife farm and used in dog 
training. 
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7. The court finds that Gurley went beyond his appropriate 
duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by contacting the United 
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry, 
and their officials, in seeking to have those government agencies 
investigate Plaintiff and create problems for the Plaintiff in 
conducting his appropriate and lawful activities. 
8. The court finds that Gurley specifically attempted to 
diminish the relationship of the plaintiff and others interested 
in dog training with the United States Forest Service by taking 
Forest Service officials to Plaintiff's leased premises and 
attempting to persuade those officials that Plaintiff was 
trespassing on forest land and was conducting unlawful activities 
thereon, 
9. The court finds that Gurley's conduct was beyond the scope 
of his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted. 
10. The court finds that Gurley's conduct was wrongful and 
constituted an effort to disregard the proclamations of the 
Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis upon which the court 
could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual 
basis to enjoin Gurley individually from such conduct, both in 
relation to Plaintiff's leasehold land in the vicinity of Vernon, 
Utah, and in relation to any persons engaged in lawful dog 
training activities elsewhere in the State of Utah. 
11. The court finds that the evidence established at trial 
that Gurley acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless 
way in disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and his leasehold 
interest in the land in question. The court finds that the 
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uncontroverted evidence established that land useful for dog 
training of a suitable type and description is difficult to find, 
difficult to value, and difficult to effectively utilize for the 
purpose of dog training because substantial acreage, upwards of or 
in the range of six square miles, is ideally riecessary for such 
activity* The court further finds that the evidence established 
that the location of Plaintiff's leased land is one of a very few 
potential sites available to dog trainers in the State of Utah 
which are so suitable. 
12. The court finds that since Plaintiff's underlying 
leasehold remains intact and there is no evidence of a present 
indication that it will not be renewed, no damages should be 
assessed for Gurley's interference with Plaintiffs leasehold 
activities resulting from his destruction of Plaintiff's pen. 
13. The court finds that the supervisors of Gurley in the 
Division of Wildlife Resources knew or should have known of 
Gurley's dislike for the activities of Plaintiff and others 
engaged in similar dog training activities and that they should 
have appropriately disciplined Gurley prior to the destruction by 
Gurley of Plaintiff's pen. The court further finds that the 
supervisors of Gurley in the Division of Wildlife Resources should 
have readily acknowledged Gurley's misconduct and affirmatively 
restrained Gurley and sought to remedy the effects of Gurley's 
misconduct with Plaintiff. 
14. The court finds that Gurley's claim that Plaintiff's bird 
pen was a "trap" is not supported by the evidence and Gurley has 
failed to meet his burden of proof that the pen was used as a 
5 
"trap" or with the intent to "take" any "protected wildlife." 
15. The court finds that there were several indicators that 
Plaintiff's recapture pen was appropriate and lawful which were 
known or should have been known to Gurley, including but not 
limited to the following: 
a. The pen was on land Gurley knew was used for upland 
game dog training by Plaintiff and others, and Gurley knew or 
should have been aware that recapture pens could properly be 
placed thereon* 
b. Bands used for banding live game birds, lawfully 
acquired, when used for dog training were found by Gurley at 
the site of the pen* 
c. Despite Gurley's arguments that the bands could be 
placed on wild birds, which were not lawfully acquired, Gurley 
knew or should have recalled that no wild Chukar Partridge had 
been seen by him in the area where the pen was located. 
d. Gurley should have inquired, before destroying 
Plaintiff's property, if the bands had been sold by or to a 
licensed Chukar Partridge owner for appropriate use in dog 
training. 
e. Gurley knew, or should have known, and could have 
observed that the recapture cones are designed to recapture 
training birds without injury and it should therefore have 
been obvious to him that the pen was maintained for a proper 
purpose. 
16. Gurley had multiple indicators that Plaintiff's pen was 
there for a lawful purpose and was obligated, including for the 
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reasons determined in the Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, which findings are reaffirmed and adopted herein by 
reference thereto, before offensively knocking it down, releasing 
the birds contained therein and destroying the pen, to make 
appropriate inquiries as to who the owner might be, as to whose 
land it might be situated on and whether the pen was there for a 
lawful purpose. 
17. The court further finds that Gurley has intentionally 
filed a false affidavit with the court and has intentionally 
conducted a defense that was inappropriate under the circumstances 
and was without merit and not asserted in good faith. 
18. The court further determines that the lack of merit and 
bad faith of Gurley7s defense includes that Gurley or the Division 
of Wildlife Resources and its representatives, including their 
representatives herein, should have readily offered to remove 
Gurley from further enforcement activities on Plaintiff's property 
knowing full well that Gurley harbored continuing hostility toward 
Plaintiff and dog training activities. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The Partial Summary Judgment herein dated June 24, 1991, 
is reaffirmed and adopted herein. 
2. The ownership, possession and operation of a bird pen for 
live game birds, lawfully acquired, equipped with recapture cones 
or devices, is lawful and proper under the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 23-17-2 and Utah Administrative Code § 608-4-3. 
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3. Peace officers, including Conservation Officers such as 
Defendant, are prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann- § 
23-20-15 from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by 
Plaintiff, 
4. Defendant may not contend that Plaintiff's recapture pen 
was there for or intended to capture "wild* birds as it was being 
used appropriately and within legal rights. 
5. The court determines that the facts establish the elements 
of conversion* 
6. The court determines that the facts establish the elements 
of interference with a contract, consisting of Plaintiff's lease 
agreement with the State of Utah. 
7. The court finds that the damages to the pen and 
replacement costs assessed in damages to the Defendant are 
$2,300.00. 
8. The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 of $15,000.00. 
9. The court finds and determines that the damages resulting 
from Defendant's interference with Plaintiff's contract rights are 
difficult or impossible to determine, including because 
Plaintiff's lease and the uses to which it was being put are 
unique, have no market value and cannot be compensated for in 
money damages, within the meaning and intent of System Concepts, 
Inc. v, Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983), and that 
Defendant's wrongs are of a continuing character, the nature, 
extent and value of which can be estimated only by conjecture, and 
that the acts of Defendant are continuing or are threatened to 
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continue, and that there is a need to enjoin and restrain 
Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any persons acting in 
concert or participation with him from further activities in 
relation to Wildlife Management on Plaintiff's leasehold land in 
the vicinity of Vernon, Utah, or from attempting to diminish the 
relationship of Plaintiff and others interested in dog training, 
including by attempting to persuade the United States Forest 
Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry that their 
activities are unlawful. The court further finds that such an 
injunction is not inconsistent with Defendant's duties under the 
circumstances, since the evidence indicated that Gurley had been 
transferred to Cedar City and thus should have no objection to 
avoiding future confrontation with Plaintiff, dog trainers or the 
land which is the subject of this suit. 
10* Plaintiff is awarded fees as stated herein, and costs 
incurred herein. •—v 
ENTERED this S^ctey o f ^ ^ v ^ w r ^ V i ^ r r 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S . (YOUNG ] rj 
District \tourtyJuage 
(0633N) ^ ' 
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DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
DALE GURLEY, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i JUDGMENT 
i Civil NOS. 90-0300-302 
) 91-0300-249 
i Judge David S. Young 
The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21 
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its 
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having entered 
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based thereon 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court makes and enters the following 
J U D G M E N T 
1. The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991, 
is affirmed and adopted herein. 
2. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion. 
•.•iOmsrKICTCOURT-TOOELE 
93 JAM-7 #112-25 
FILED CY lL 
3. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract. 
4. Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in 
the amount of $2,300.00 
5. Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting 
in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from 
diminishing or interfering with, or attempting to diminish or 
Interfere with the relationship of Plaintiff and others interested 
in dog training, including by attempting to persuade the United 
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry 
that their activities are unlawful, or from conducting further 
wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold lands 
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or 
indirectly, described as follows: 
Township 9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M 
Section 15: SW4, W2SE4 
Section 16: SE4 
Section 22: N2NW4 
6. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
ENTERED this ^ day of ^ ^3^1^^1995. 
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MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
JANUARY 5, 1993 
Civil No. 90-0300-302 
and 
Civil No. 91-0300-249 
Defendant, by and through his counsel, hereby moves to set 
aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
entered by this Court on January 5, 1993. The basis for this 
motion is that the Court entered judgment prematurely and before 
the time had expired for defendant to enter objections as to the 
form of the Order. Objections to the form of the Order were made 
to plaintiff's counsel on January 7, 1993, and defendant's 
counsel was never notified by counsel for plaintiff or the Court 
that judgment had been entered. Counsel for defendant learned of 
the entry of judgment on January 20, 1993, when he called the 
Clerk of the Court. 
This motion is supported by a legal memorandum of even date 
herewith. 
DATED this ,Xl day of January,, 1993. 
WltLIAWS Sc HUNT/ 
//AAA 
^Dennis C. Ferguson 
Attorneys for Defenda/nt 
#18219 
2 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
Heather Barney, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant 
herein; that she served the attached MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT ENTERED JANUARY 5, 1993, 
in Civil Nos. 90-0300-302 and 91-0300-249 before the Third 
District Court for Tooele County, upon the parties listed below 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Daniel D. Darger 
32 Exchange Place, Suite #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Parker M. Nielson 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed, postage prepaid, on the 
day of January, 1993. 
<=>+ 
Heat Her Bar: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this A' 
January, 19 93. 
...Jfif/V-'; 
-7 6c3t2..c";: 
«\!y Commissicn d 
2*^30.1994* 




. ic ' L ^Totafy Pub l : 
Residing in the State of Utah 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





I NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
i JUDGMENT 
i Civil Nos. 900 300 302 
) 91-0300 249 
) Judge David S. Young 
TO: Defendant Dale Gurley and his counsel, 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that Judgment was entered 
herein by the Honorable David S. Young on January 5, 1993 and 
entered by the Clerk of the above entitled court on January 7, 
1993. Certified copies of the Judgment and the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law entered by Judge Young are attached. 
You should govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this <^*^ day of January, 1993, 
x 
^Parker M. Nielson 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I Bailed a true copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, with attachments, firct claoo, 
postage prepaid, this & 2 fhtL day of January, 1993 to: 
Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
/ 
(0656) 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
DALE GURLEY, ] 
Defendant. ; 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Civil Nos. 900 300 302 
I 91-0300 249 
Judge David S. Young 
TO: Defendant Dale Gurley and his counsel, 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that Amended Judgment was 
entered herein by the Honorable David S. Young on January 27, 
1993. A conformed copy of the Amended Judgment entered by Judge 
Young is attached. 
You should govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1993. 
Parker M. Nielson ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true copy of the 
foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF AMENDED JUDGMENT, with attachment, 
this 2nd day of February, 1993 to: 
Dennis C Ferguson, Esq, 
Jody K. Burnett, Esq. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
./jy LLC{^ y
 xc cd (if. ttt.c'/e 
(0656) 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





i AMENDED JUDGMENT 
i Civil Nos. 90-0300-302 
i 91-0300-249 
i Judge David S. Young 
The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21 
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its 
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having entered 
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based thereon 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court makes and enters the following 
J U D G M E N T 
1. The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991, 
is affirmed and adopted herein, 
2. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion. 
3. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract. 
4. Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in 
the amount of $2,300.00 
5. Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting 
in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from 
diminishing or interfering with, or attempting to diminish or 
interfere with the relationship of Plaintiff and others interested 
in dog training, including by attempting to persuade the United 
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry 
that their activities are unlawful, or from conducting further 
wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold lands 
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or 
indirectly, described as follows: 
Township 9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M 
Section 15: SW4, W2SE4 
Section 16: SE4 
Section 22: N2NW4 
6. Plaintiff is awarded costs, and attorneys' fees in the 
amount of $15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56. 
ENTERED this 27 ^ day of January, 1993. 
B* THE COURT: 
j£ 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
District Court Judge 
(0633N) 

BRYCE E. ROE (2785) 
36 South State Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0202 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, 
Plaintiff, ) S_ U M M Q N S_ 
vs. ) 
JOHN P. SOLTIS, REED M. ) Civil No. 920902406 CV 
STRINGHAM, III, DALE GURLEY, ) 
TIMOTHY H. PROVAN, R. PAUL ) 
VAN DAM, DIVISION OF WILDLIFE ) 
RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH and ) 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ) Judge David S. Young 
UTAH, ) 
Defendants. ) 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: 
JOHN P. SOLTIS 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to file an answer in 
writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the 
above-entitled Court, and to serve upon or mail to Daniel Darger, 
Esq. , 100 Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake 
yrtN \&bjU Sct-771 
Si'.:-T-C&.\STA3L 
se 
City, Utah 84111, or Parker M. Nielson, Esq., 655 South 200 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said answer within twenty 
(20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, a copy of 
which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 1992. 
BRYCE E. ROE, ESQ. 
DANIEL DARGER, ESQ. 
PARKER M. NIELSON, ESQ. 
/{/ / '/// ''/fau^&r^ Bv / <*l 
~7 Parker M. Nielson 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
(0550N) 
Serve Defendant at: 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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BRYCE E. ROE (2785) 
36 South State Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0202 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN P. SOLTIS, REED M. 
STRINGHAM, III, DALE GURLEY, 
TIMOTHY H. PROVAN, R. PAUL 
VAN DAM, DIVISION OF WILDLIFE 
RESOURCES, STATE OF UTAH and 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Defendants. 
C O M P L A I N T 
C i v i l No. 
Plaintiff complains of Defendants and alleges: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of both Salt Lake City and Vernon 
in the State of Utah and a citizen of the United States. 
2. Defendants John P. Soltis ("Soltis" herein) and Reed M. 
Stringham, III, ("Stringham" herein) are residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah and, at all times alleged were Deputy 
Attorneys General for the State of Utah and acted as legal counsel 
for and agents of Defendant Dale Gurley with respect to 
proceedings before the Third Judicial District Court for Tooele 
County, Utah ("The Court* herein), in a case entitled Parker M. 
Nielson vs. Dale Gurley, Docket No. 900 300 302. Soltis and 
Stringham are sued herein in their individual capacities and not 
in their official capacity as officers or employees of the State 
of Utah. 
3. Defendant Dale Gurley ("Gurley" herein) is a resident of 
Payson in the State of Utah and was, at all times alleged, a 
Conservation Officer employed by the Division of Wildlife 
Resources, Department of Natural Resources, State of Utah ("DWR" 
herein), having peace officer authority. Gurley is sued herein in 
his individual capacity and not in his official capacity as an 
officer or employee of the State of Utah. 
4. Defendant Timothy H. Provan ("Provan" herein) is a 
resident of the State of Utah and, at all times alleged, was the 
Director of DWR and the superior to Gurley with respect to 
Gurley's conduct alleged. Provan is sued in his individual 
capacity, and in his representative and official capacity as an 
officer or employee of the State of Utah. 
5. Defendant R. Paul Van Dam ("Van Dam" herein) is a resident 
of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, and at all times alleged was the 
Attorney General of the State of Utah and the superior to Soltis 
and Stringham with respect to their conduct alleged. Van Dam is 
sued in his individual capacity, and in his representative and 
official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Utah. 
6. The Division of Wildlife Resources, State of Utah ("DWR" 
herein), is a governmental entity for the purposes of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-2, existing under provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-34-3. 
7. The Attorney General of the State of Utah is a 
governmental entity for the purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2, 
existing under provisions of Constitution of Utah, Art. VII, §§1 
and 3, and Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
8. Concurrent jurisdiction of the above-entitled Court, 
together with the courts of the United States, is available under 
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343, this Complaint alleging 
violations of various Acts of Congress providing for the 
protection of civil rights, including the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and by reason of the further facts alleged 
herein that Defendants Soltis, Stringham, Gurley, Provan and Van 
Dam, individually and in concert and conspiracy with other 
persons, or by aiding, abetting and assisting the acts of others, 
under color of various state statutes, ordinances, regulations, 
customs or usages, caused the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights, 
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States and the State of Utah and impeded, hindered, 
obstructed or defeated the due course of justice in the State of 
Utah with intent to deny Plaintiff the equal protection of the 
laws or injure Plaintiff or his property including by acts done in 
furtherance of a conspiracy to impede, obstruct or defeat the due 
- 3 -
course of justice and equal protection of the laws in violation of 
said Acts of Congress, and failed to prevent or to aid in 
preventing wrongs mentioned in 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 
9. Venue is proper in the above-entitled Court under 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30*17, and because various acts 
complained of occurred in Salt Lake County. 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY/WRITTEN UNDERTAKING 
10. Provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-1, £t. seq., and provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-11-10 and 63-30-19 concerning the filing of an undertaking to 
pay costs have no application herein, this action asserting claims 
under provisions of federal law as to which the states are without 
power under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
to impose conditions or requirements not prescribed by Congress. 
11. Provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act do not 
apply to this action for the reasons that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-4(3)(b)(i) and (4) exempt acts performed with malice, it 
having been adjudicated by The Court in said Docket No. 900 300 
302 that Gurley acted with malice with respect to the matters 
alleged herein, and it being alleged that Soltis, Stringham, Provan 
and Van Dam participated in Gurley's malice and deception on The 
Court; because actions arising out of contractual rights with the 
State of Utah are alleged, and Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) waives 
governmental immunity and the requirement of filing a notice of 
claim as actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations; 
because Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 waives immunity from suit for 
the recovery of damages to private property, this action alleging 
such damage; and because Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6 waives 
governmental immunity for suits to recover property, this action 
alleging deprivation of interests in real and personal property 
and rights to recovery thereof. 
12. To the extent that said notice of claim and written under-
taking provisions may apply to claims herein not based upon federal 
law and not otherwise exempt# Plaintiff has complied with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, ££. seq,, by 
filing notice of claim, thereby satisfying the requirements of all 
applicable statutes of limiations and the Governmental Immunity 
Act, including on December 4, 1991, a copy of which is attached 
hereto. Said Notice was timely, being within one (1) year of 
April 18, 1991, which was the first indication that Gurley, Soltis 
or Stringham claimed that Gurley's conduct was pursuant to issuance 
of a citation or otherwise pursuant to peace officer authority, 
and said notice of claim was denied, within the meaning and intent 
of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14, neither the State of Utah nor its 
insurance carrier having notified Plaintiff in writing of approval 
or denial of the claim. 
13. Provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-11-10 and 63-30-19 
concerning the filing of an undertaking to pay costs do not apply 
to the matters alleged, this action asserting claims under 
provisions of federal law as to which the states are without power 
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to 
impose conditions or requirements not prescribed by Congress, and 
for the dual reasons that Gurley did not indicate, in any way, 
that his conduct alleged herein occurred during the performance of 
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his duties as a peace officer or as an employee of the State of 
Utah or was within the scope of his employment or under color of 
authority until after suit had been initiated against him in said 
Docket No. 900 300 302, and compliance with said provisions is not 
required under provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5(1) as to 
actions sounding in contract. To the extent that said provisions 
may apply to claims herein not based on federal law, or to Soltis, 
Stringham, Provan and Van Dam, Plaintiff has nevertheless obtained 
an order of the above-entitled Court fixing the amount of 
undertaking, should said provisions apply, and a written 
undertaking signed by two (2) sureties, which undertaking is 
attached to or filed contemporaneously with this Complaint. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
14. At all times alleged Plaintiff had property rights, in 
common with Messrs. Leslie Foote and Roy N. Byrd, by virtue of 
Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 with the State of Utah, 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, in the following lands 
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah: 
Township 9 South, Range 6 West. SLB&M 
Section 15: SW4, W2SE4 
Section 16: SE4 
Section 22: N2NW4 
Said lease is for the specific purpose of "releasing and 
propagating game birds for hunting dog training and conducting 
non-commercial competition of hunting dogs," 
15. The lessees as to said Lease No. 798, acting by and 
through Leslie Foote, applied to DWR for and were issued a 
Certificate of Registration for a Private Wildlife Farm at T.9S., 
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R.6W., SLB&M, Sec. 15, 16, 22, Tooele Co., which is inclusive of 
the lands embraced by Lease No. 798. Said Certificate of 
Registration, No. PWF-SLO-129, was pursuant to an application for 
the purpose of "dog training and incidental propagation." 
16. On September 8, 1990, and for a period of more than one 
year prior thereto, Plaintiff owned and maintained a locked and 
secure pen and related facilities for raising and possessing live 
game birds on or in conjunction with said Lease No. 798 and said 
Certificate of Registration, No. PWF-SLO-129, outfitted or 
equipped with devices, known as "recall cones," for maintaining 
possession and control over privately owned game birds outside of, 
but in near proximity to, the pen. 
17. DWR has issued a "Proclamation for the Possession of Live 
Game Birds," provisions of which are controlling as to all 
persons, including peace officers or persons assisting peace 
officers and those holding a Certificate of Registration for a 
Private Wildlife Farm or otherwise possessing live game birds. 
Said proclamation contains the following provisions pertinent to 
this Complaint: 
(a) A "private wildlife farm" is defined as 
"[a]n enclosed place such as, but not limited 
to. a pen or aviary, where privately owned game 
birds are propagated or kept and which 
enclosure restricts the birds from escaping 
into the wild." (Emphasis added.) 
(b) "A certificate of registration IS NOT 
required for a person to acquire live game 
birds for the purpose of training dogs . . ..." 
(Emphasis in original.) 
(c) "Any peace officer or special function 
officer may request persons engaged in 
activities covered under these rules to exhibit 
any documentation related to such activities 
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(including, but not limited to, certificate of 
registration, permit, health certificate, bill 
of sale, proof of ownership), any game birds, 
and any device, apparatus and facility used for 
activities covered under these rules.* 
18. The Wildlife Resources Code of Utah, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 23-13-14, and the Proclamation for the Possession of Live Game 
Birds, Utah Administrative Code R608-4-3, provide that "live gam 
birds may not be released or abandoned without first obtaining 
written authorization from the Director of the [Wildlife 
Resources] Division." 
19. Various provisions of The Wildlife Resources Code of 
Utah, including Utah Code Ann. § 23-17-2, permit, inter alia, 
persons legally possessing live game birds to restrict them and 
prevent their release or abandonment into the wild, as they are 
required to do by said provisions alleged in the preceding 
paragraph, by "taking" or "trapping," including by recall pens, 
"any birds . . . held in private ownership legally acquired." Tl 
process of recalling, or trapping, birds in private ownership bu 
which may be temporarily out of a holding pen for dog training 
also constitutes the maintenance, control and constructive 
possession of and over domestic game birds acquired from a legal 
source. 
20. Said Proclamation for Taking of Upland Game was adopted 
by the State of Utah Wildlife Board providing, in pertinent part 
as follows: 
DAMAGE OF PROPERTY . . . [I]t is unlawful 
for any person, without the consent of the 
owner or person in charge of any privately 
owned land, to tear down, mutilate or destroy 
any . . . fence or other enclosure on this 
privately owned land. . . . 
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"Privately owned land" includes leasehold interests in land. Said 
provision is identical with Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15. 
CONDUCT OF GURLEY 
21. On September 8, 1990, Gurley did tear down# mutilate or 
destroy said pen in disregard of Plaintiff's rights thereto and in 
disregard of the Constitution and lavs of the United States and 
the laws of the State of Utah and proclamations of the Wildlife 
Board alleged herein. 
22. On September 8, 1990, Gurley destroyed, or converted to 
his own use, the following described personal property of 
Plaintiff located in or in conjunction with said bird pen: 
Approximately fifteen (15) bands for marking 
game birds, two (2) game bird feeders, one bag 
of game bird feed and one plastic container 
containing game bird feed, two (2) game bird 
watering devices, one float control for 
livestock watering and related hoses and 
fixtures for watering wildlife (not limited to 
game birds) and domestic birds and at least one 
live game bird (Chukar Partridge) together with 
at least six (6) other game birds (Chukar 
Partridge) which were under Plaintiff's 
constructive possession and control by virtue 
of said game farm facilities and equipment but 
which are now lost by reason of the removal of 
said "call" bird. 
23. Gurley did not request Plaintiff, at any time, to exhibit 
any documentation, including any certificate of registration, 
permit, bill of sale or proof of ownership of any game birds or 
any device, apparatus and facility used or related to such 
activities. 
24. The conduct of Gurley was not within the scope of or 
pursuant to peace officer authority, including because it was not 
pursuant to a warrant, or in connection with any arrest of 
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Plaintiff or any other person, including by issuance of any 
citation to Plaintiff or any other person for any alleged 
violation of law. 
25. Gurley's conduct was under color of various statutes, 
ordinances, regulations, customs or usages of the State of Utah. 
Gurley has in fact alleged in Docket No. 900 300 302 in the Third 
Judicial District Court for Tooele County, Utah, that his conduct 
"was . . . under color of any statute or regulation of the State 
of Utah, or pursuant to any custom or usage of the Department of 
Wildlife Resources . . . " 
26. The wrongfulness of Gurley's conduct is an adjudicated 
fact by virtue of the Partial Summary Judgment entered by The 
Court in said Docket No. 900 300 302, determining that "Peace 
officers, including Conservation Officers such as [Gurley], are 
prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15 from 
breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by Plaintiff and 
that "the conduct of [Gurley] was therefore without probable cause 
or authority under provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1 that 
Conservation Officers shall follow the same procedure 
in . . . enforcement of this code, as other peace officers" and 
the determination of The Court dated December 23, 1991, that the 
sworn statement of Gurley to the contrary "is riddled with 
untruths." 
27. From time to time over a period of years prior to 
September 8, 1990, commencing on or about December 30, 1986, 
Gurley has made public statements to the effect that he would 
interfere with and prevent Plaintiff's conduct of hunting dog 
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training near Vernon by causing Plaintiff to be cited, arrested or 
prosecuted over matters which he, Gurley, would initiate or cause 
to be initiated. 
28. The conduct of Gurley alleged was performed with actual 
malice toward Plaintiff, including for the reasons alleged in the 
next preceding paragraph. Gurley's malice is an adjudicated fact 
by reason of the Partial Summary Judgment of The Court in said 
Docket No. 900 300 302 determining that "Defendant was sufficient-
ly familiar with the laws and regulations concerning possession of 
live game birds, and the proper procedure for questioning the 
authority of persons in possession of live game birds, to create 
an inference that his conduct was with malice towards dog trainers 
as a group or Plaintiff in particular" (emphasis added) and the 
determination of The Court dated January 31, 1992, that the sworn 
statement of Gurley to the contrary "is riddled with untruths" and 
"for the purpose of denying Plaintiff's rights in [said] litiga-
tion wrongfully and without just cause or excuse." 
CONDUCT OF SOLTIS, STRINGHAM AND GURLEY 
29. On October 22, 1990, Gurley alleged, truthfully and under 
oath, that he "made no arrest of Plaintiff, including bv issuance 
of anv citation for any alleged violation of law, on September 8, 
1990, or at anv time thereafter . . . ." (emphasis added) and 
Stringham filed Gurley's allegation with The Court in said Docket 
No. 900 300 302. 
30. Subsequent to the acts alleged herein on September 8, 
1990, and October 22, 1990, Plaintiff is informed and believes, 
and on such information and belief alleges, that Defendants 
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Soltis, Stringham and Gurley entered into a conspiracy to conceal 
the wrongfulness of the conduct of Gurley and to obstruct and 
impede Plaintiff in the assertion of his rights secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Utah. 
Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on information and 
belief alleges, that said conspiracy included the simulation and 
backdating by Gurley of investigative reports and legal process in 
the form of a citation purporting to charge Plaintiff with 
violations of law; false swearing by Gurley to an affidavit 
stating that his conduct was a proper exercise of peace officer 
authority and pursuant to issuance by him of a citation charging 
Plaintiff with violations of law on September 13, 1990, though in 
truth and in fact no citation was ever issued; and filing the 
false affidavit, backdated investigative reports and simulated, 
false and fictitious process with the courts of the State of Utah. 
31. Pursuant to said conspiracy, Gurley executed, under oath, 
an affidavit on or about April 18, 1991 stating that Gurley 
"issued a citation to plaintiff on or about September 13, 1990," 
that a "true and correct" copy of the citation was attached and 
that Gurley "served" the citation on Plaintiff "by mailing it to 
him" on or about September 13, 1990, each of which statements were 
false. 
32. Said affidavit of Gurley dated April 18, 1991, was 
prepared for him by Defendants Soltis and Stringham, either 
directly or as agents of one another, and filed by Defendants 
Soltis, Stringham and Gurley, either directly or as agents of one 
another, with The Court in said Docket No. 900 300 302 on or about 
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April 19, 1991 and at various times thereafter. Said acts by 
Soltis, Stringham and Gurley were pursuant to the conspiracy 
alleged. 
33. The falsity of said affidavit dated April 18, 1991, was 
acknowledged by Gurley, Soltis and Stringham in subsequent 
admissions in said Docket No. 900 300 302, including by admissions 
that "a citation, if issued, must include an appearance date and 
that the appearance date must be not less than five nor more than 
14 days from the date of issuance," and that "the citation, if 
issued, must be filed with the appropriate court within five (5) 
days," none of which conditions were satisfied. For those 
reasons, among others, the "citation" attached to said affidavit 
dated April 18, 1991, was in fact a simulation, and without any 
validity or effect. The attachment of the simulated citation to 
said affidavit and the filing of it with The Court was in pursuit 
of the conspiracy. 
34. Said simulated citation attached to the affidavit dated 
April 18, 1991, was in fact never mailed to Plaintiff but in fact 
the "defendant's copy" thereof was given by Gurley to Soltis and 
Stringham in October of 1990 and retained by them in their 
possession at all material times thereafter. Soltis and Stringham 
therefore knew, or were chargeable with knowledge, at all material 
times from and after early October of 1990, that the form of 
citation attached to the Gurley affidavit of April 18, 1991, was a 
simulation and that the simulated citation was not mailed to or 
otherwise served on Plaintiff. The acts of Soltis and Stringham 
in retaining the simulated citation in their files and their 
failure to reveal the true facts concerning it to Plaintiff and 
The Court were further acts in pursuit of the conspiracy* 
35. The conduct of Soltis and Stringham in filing the 
simulated citation with The Court and preparing said affidavit 
falsely stating that the simulated citation had been issued by 
mailing it to Plaintiff on or about September 13, 1990, was not in 
the judicial phase of any criminal proceeding, but was an aspect 
of Soltis and Stringham acting as attorneys for Gurley 
investigating civil proceedings, and was therefore not immune from 
provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986. 
36. At all times alleged Soltis and Stringham were obligated, 
by provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
certify that every pleading "or other paper" filed by them had 
been read by them and that "to the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
37. At all times alleged, Soltis and Stringham were further 
obligated to act with candor to court and counsel, including by 
provisions of Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah 
State Bar Association (effective Jan. 1, 1988), including in 
particular the following provision: 
(4) . • . . If a lawyer has offered material 
evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the 
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, 
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue 
to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply 
even if compliance requires disclosure of 
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
[Viz., requires breach of confidentiality.] 
38. At all times alleged, Soltis and Stringham were further 
obligated by the commentary to said Rule 3.3, which provides that 
"if necessary to rectify the situation, an advocate must disclose 
the existence of the client's deception to the court or to the 
other party" even if the disclosure results in "a prosecution for 
perjury," and that if the lawyer fails to do so "the alternative 
is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby 
subverting the truth-finding process which the adversary system is 
designed to implement." 
39. At all times alleged, Soltis and Stringham were further 
obligated by the provisions of DR 7-102(A)(4), ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall 
not "knowingly use" perjured testimony or false evidence and that 
a lawyer "who receives information clearly establishing that . . . 
his client has . . . perpetrated a fraud upon . . . a tribunal 
shall [if the client does not rectify the situation] reveal the 
fraud . . . to the . . . tribunal," and by the provisions of DR 
7-102(A)(6) that "a lawyer shall not participate in the creation 
or preservation of evidence when he knows or it is obvious that 
the evidence is false." 
40. At all times alleged, Soltis and Stringham were public 
prosecutors bound in the discharge of their office of public trust 
to behave with scrupulous fairness. That obligation is imposed by 
ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-14, which provides 
that "[w]ith respect to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has 
responsibilities different from those of a lawyer in private 
practice" and may "not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence 
merely because he believes it will damage the prosecutor's case 
. . . ," and by numerous authorities holding that the prosecutor 
is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; 
and whose interest . • • is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice be done. As such, 
he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the 
servant of the law. . . . He may prosecute 
with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should 
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he 
is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is 
as much his duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one. Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934). 
41. Over more than seven (7) months subsequent to the filing 
of said affidavit and simulated citation, commencing shortly after 
the affidavit was filed and continuing through and including 
October 14, 1991, Plaintiff informed Soltis and his superior, 
Defendant Van Dam, that the affidavit dated April 18, 1990, was 
false and made repeated demands upon Van Dam, Soltis and Stringham 
that they retract or otherwise disavow obvious perjury contained 
in the affidavit pursuant to their professional obligations 
alleged in the six (6) preceding paragraphs. Plaintiff received 
no response of any description from Soltis and neither Soltis, 
Stringham, nor Van Dam undertook to withdraw said affidavit or 
advise the court of the true facts in regard to the simulated 
citation. Refusal of Soltis, Stringham and Van Dam in that regard 
was for the purpose of avoiding disclosure of Gurley's perjury and 
avoiding disclosure of the participation of Soltis and Stringham 
in composing and filing the perjury with the Court and was 
pursuant to the conspiracy, 
42. Soltis and Stringham disregarded their obligations as set 
forth in each of the preceding seven (7) paragraphs. Their 
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conduct in so disregarding their ethical and professional 
obligations was for the purpose of concealing the wrongful conduct 
of Gurley and themselves and was in pursuit of the conspiracy. 
43. The acts of Soltis and Stringham alleged constitute acts 
in concert with Gurley# or the aiding, abetting or assistance to 
Gurley, within the meaning and intent of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 
and 1986, and Soltis and Stringham cooperated with Gurley in 
deceiving the court and subverting the truth-finding process, 
within the meaning and intent of Rule 3.3, Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar Association and the commentary 
thereto, by refusing to withdraw the affidavit of April 18, 1991 
or make full disclosure to the court and Plaintiff that it 
contained perjury, and Defendants Soltis and Stringham are 
therefore principals with respect to the wrongful acts of Gurley 
alleged herein. 
CONDUCT OF PROVAN (AND DWR) 
AND VAN DAM (AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
44. At all times alleged, Provan was the Director of DWR, the 
superior to Gurley and responsible to supervise and control 
Gurley7s conduct, and acted in both his personal and representa-
tive capacities. 
45. At all times alleged, Van Dam was the Attorney General of 
the State of Utah, the superior to Soltis and Stringham and 
responsible to supervise and control the conduct of Soltis and 
Stringham, and acted in both his personal and representative 
capacities. 
46. Provan knew, or had reason to know for a period of years 
prior to September 8, 1990# that Gurley was acting outside the 
scope of his employment with respect to groups or persons, 
including Plaintiff, engaged in training hunting dogs by means of 
the use of live, domestic game birds, lawfully acquired, pursuant 
to said proclamations of DWR and the Wildlife Board; that Gurley's 
conduct created an unreasonable risk of harm to the lawful 
interests of such persons; and Provan knew or had reason to know 
that he had the ability to control Gurley and that such control 
was necessary to prevent the unreasonable harm to lawful rights of 
others under the laws and proclamations of the Wildlife Board. 
47. Provan was informed of the conduct of Gurley alleged 
herein on or about September 10, 1990, and was further informed of 
Gurley's conduct alleged herein thereafter, but declined to take 
any action with respect thereto in his capacity as Gurley's 
superior. 
48. Van Dam was informed, on or about October 9, 1991, and 
thereafter, of the wrongful conduct of Soltis and Stringham, and 
acknowledged being so informed and of his obligation to supervise 
Soltis and Stringham in a letter to Plaintiff dated October 11, 
1991, but declined to take any action with respect thereto in his 
capacity as Soltis and Stringham's superior. 
49. Provan and Van Dam were further obligated to take 
corrective action with respect to the conduct of Gurley under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2, providing that property in 
the possession of any peace officer not needed as evidence shall 
be returned to the lawful owner by the prosecutor and the agency 
having possession thereof. At all times alleged, Van Dam was the 
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"prosecuting attorney" and Provan was the Director of the agency 
employing Gurley, within the meaning and intent of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-24-2, and Plaintiff served notice on Provan and Van Dam, 
together with Soltis, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2, 
demanding return of the property alleged herein, on November 25, 
1991. 
50. Provan, Van Dam and Soltis have failed to respond to said 
demand pursuant tr Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2 in a reasonable time, 
directly or indirectly, or as required by said statute and 
Plaintiff believes, based upon reasonable information, and on such 
belief alleges, that Provan, Soltis and Stringham failed to 
respond to Plaintiff's demand for the return of his property in 
any way until they and/or Gurley were confronted with the prospect 
of discipline for their refusal by agencies or officials of the 
State of Utah charged with regulation and control of law 
enforcement. Refusal by Gurley, Provan, Soltis and Van Dam to 
respond to Plaintiff's demand in a reasonable time, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2, was pursuant to the conspiracy alleged. 
51. Defendants Provan and Van Dam failed to prevent the 
wrongful conduct of Gurley, Soltis and Stringham alleged herein, 
within the meaning and intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. 
DAMAGES AND EQUITABLE RELIEF 
52. The conduct of Defendants amounts to interference with 
contract rights of Plaintiff, including rights under said Lease 
No. 798 and Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SLO-129, which 
have no commercial value but significant and unique value to 
Plaintiff and a class composed of persons engaged in training bird 
dogs who are the direct beneficiaries of said lease and game farm 
permit, the actual amount of which is difficult to appraise, but 
are believed by Plaintiff to have a fair and reasonable value of 
approximately $10,000.00. 
53. Plaintiff has suffered loss of his professional time and 
been required to incur expenses for legal counsel herein, and in 
the prosecution in The Court of Docket No. 900 300 302 in an 
amount which is not yet determined but which Plaintiff believes 
and alleges will be in excess of $50,000.00. 
54. As a further result of the intentional and wrongful acts 
and failures to act as alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered 
anxiety, apprehension, worry, embarrassment and other mental 
anguish and as a result, has suffered damages in such amounts as 
shall be proved at trial. 
55. Gurley's conduct will, unless restrained or enjoined, 
result in immediate and irreparable injury to Plaintiff for which 
there is no adequate remedy at law, for which money damages are 
inadequate, including because Gurley's conduct, unless restrained 
or enjoined, will result in injury to Plaintiff's reputation and 
association with the Forest Service and other agencies of state 
and federal government, Plaintiff will be prevented from 
exercising the rights contracted for with the State of Utah in 
Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 and will be prevented, both 
directly and through his partner and co-lessee, Leslie Foote, from 
exercising the rights under Certificate of Registration No. 
PWF-SLO-129, all of which are of unique value and which cannot be 
valued or compensated for in a money judgment or a judgment at law. 
56. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on such 
information and belief alleges, that there is a need for 
injunctive relief because Gurley has continued his unlawful 
activities, in defiance and contempt of the orders jof The Court, 
either individually or in concert and participation with others, 
including Provan, including by exceeding their statutory authority 
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-17-8, 23-14-18(4) and 23-14-8, which 
vest authority for establishing wildlife conservation rules in the 
Wildlife Board and limit administrative and law enforcement 
personnel of DV7R to execution of the policies of the Wildlife 
Board, and by disregarding resolutions of the Wildlife Board 
permitting dog trials in the State of Utah at any time, including 
during the nesting season, other than in designated wildlife 
preserves. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
57. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56. 
58. The peaceable and quiet possession of Plaintiff's rights 
under Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 with the State of Utah, 
Certificate of Registration, No. PWF-SLO-129 and the peaceable, 
quiet and unmolested operation of Plaintiff's bird pen in 
conjunction therewith are Constitutionally-protected property 
rights; and the right to own and possess domestic game birds, 
lawfully acquired, conduct the training of bird dogs by means of 
the use of domestic game birds, lawfully acquired, pursuant to the 
laws and proclamations of the State of Utah alleged, to conduct 
litigation in the courts of the State of Utah to redress the 
wrongful conduct of Gurley and to the return of Plaintiff's 
property on demand pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2/ are 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States and the State of Utah, within the 
meaning and intent of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. 
59. The conduct of Soltis, Stringham and Gurley was performed 
under color of various statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs 
or usages of the State of Utah and caused Plaintiff to be deprived 
of various rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, in violation of 42 
U.S.C- § 1983. 
60. The conduct of Soltis, Stringham and Gurley was in 
disregard of the rights of Plaintiff secured by the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States proscribing 
"any State [to] deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law; nor to deny any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
61. The conduct of Soltis and Stringham went beyond merely 
acting as an advocate and consisted of joint action with Gurley in 
preparing simulated judicial process and composing a false 
statement that the simulated process had been "issued," and filing 
false process in the form of the simulated citation and false 
affidavit with The Court, the purpose or effect of which was to 
deprive Plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution and laws 
of the United States and the State of Utah, under color of various 
statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs or usages of the State 
of Utah. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
62. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56 and 58 through 61. 
63. The conduct of Soltis, Stringham and Gurley was pursuant 
to a conspiracy to obstruct the processes of any court of the 
United States, including in particular proceedings before the 
Third Judicial District Court for Tooele County, Utah, in said 
Docket No. 900 300 302. 
64. One of the purposes of said Docket No. 900 300 302 was to 
enforce and protect, by or through the device of a test case, the 
rights of Plaintiff's co-lessees under said lease with the State 
of Utah and said wildlife farm permit and the rights of a class of 
persons comprised of all dog trainers who are direct or indirect 
beneficiaries of said lease. 
65. Soltis, Stringham and Gurley, acting with two or more 
persons in the State of Utah, conspired for the purpose of 
impeding, hindering, obstructing or defeating the due course of 
justice in the State of Utah, with the intent to deny Plaintiff, 
who is a citizen of the United States, the equal protection of the 
laws or to injure Plaintiff or his property for lawfully 
enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person to 
the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the provisions 
Of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
66. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56 and 58 through 61. 
67. Soltis, Stringham and Gurley, acting with two or more 
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persons in the State of Utah conspired for the purpose of 
depriving Plaintiff, either directly or indirectly, of the equal 
protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities of 
the laws, including in particular the right to peaceably possess 
Plaintiff's leasehold rights with the State of Utah, to possess 
and own domestic game birds lawfully acquired and to engage in the 
recreational activity of training bird dogs through the use of 
domestic game birds lawfully acquired and further conspired to 
prevent or hinder the constituted authorities of the State of 
Utah, including members of the judiciary of the State of Utah, 
from giving or securing Plaintiff and other persons similarly 
situated the equal protection of the laws. Said conduct was in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 
68, An element of the conspiracy was the invidious and 
discriminatory purpose of Gurley to impede or prevent the training 
of dogs and the conduct of field trials for the display of dog 
training in the Vernon area, pursuant to the laws and proclama-
tions of the State of Utah, by the entire class of persons engaged 
in dog training in the State of Utah, which purpose has been 
stated by Gurley on numerous occasions to numerous persons, 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
69- Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56 and 58 through 61. 
70. Defendants Provan and Van Dam, having knowledge of the 
wrongs conspired to be done by Gurley, Soltis and Stringham, and 
others as alleged herein, or that said wrongs were about to be 
committed, and having the power to prevent or aid in preventing 
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the commission of said wrongs, neglected or refused to do so in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. 
71. Defendants Provan and Van Dam are liable to Plaintiff for 
all damages caused by the wrongful acts alleged in the preceding 
paragraph, including damages for loss or injury to Plaintiff's 
contract rights and other property, mental anguish, attorneys' 
fees herein and loss of Plaintiff's professional time in the 
prosecution of actions against Gurley in The Court in Docket No. 
900 300 302. 
72. Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action did not accrue until 
within one year prior to the filing of this Complaint for the 
reason that the acts of Provan and Van Dam alleged did not occur 
until after the filing by Defendants Soltis and Stringham of the 
simulated legal process and false affidavit on April 18, 1991, and 
after Van Dam was informed of the wrongful acts of Soltis and 
Stringham and of Van Dam's obligations with respect thereto, which 
information was given on or about October 9, 1991. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
73. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56. 
74. Plaintiff's rights under said Lease No. 798 and 
Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SLO-129 are contract rights 
with the State of Utah. 
75. Defendants Soltis, Stringham and Gurley acted or failed 
to act due to fraud or malice in the simulation and backdating of 
a citation and investigative reports, the preparation by Soltis 
and Stringham and false swearing by Gurley to a false affidavit, 
the filing of the false affidavit with The Court and the refusal 
of Soltis and Stringham to disclose the fraud and deception of 
Gurley in relation to the simulated citation and false affidavit 
as alleged herein, within the meaning and intent of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-4(4) 
76. Gurley acted intentionally with respect to his conduct 
alleged at various times including on September 8, 1990, September 
13, 1990, and April 18, 1991, and knew or was chargeable with 
knowledge that his conduct would be substantially certain to 
interfere with Plaintiff's contract rights with the State of Utah. 
77• Soltis, Stringham and Provan acted intentionally with 
respect to their conduct alleged at various times including on and 
after April 18, 1991, and knew or were chargeable with knowledge 
that their conduct would be substantially certain to interfere 
with Plaintiff's contract rights with the State of Utah. 
78. The conduct of Soltis and Stringham, considered 
separately from the conduct of Gurley, constitutes a breach of 
duty under the statutes, rules of civil procedure and provisions 
of the code of professional responsibility of the legal profession 
alleged, and Soltis and Stringham knew or were chargeable with 
knowledge that their conduct gave substantial assistance and 
encouragement to Gurley in the accomplishment of his wrongful and 
tortious acts. Soltis and Stringham are, therefore, persons 
acting in concert with Gurley and jointly liable for the conduct 
of Gurley. 
79. The conduct of Soltis, Van Dam and Provan, considered 
separately from the conduct of Gurley, constitutes a breach of 
dutv under Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-2 and Soltis, Van Dam and Provan 
knew or were chargeable with knowledge that their conduct gave 
substantial assistance and encouragement to Gurley in the 
accomplishment of his wrongful and tortious acts. Soltis, Van Dam 
and Provan are# therefore, persons acting in concert with Gurley 
and jointly liable for the conduct of Gurley. 
80. The conduct of Soltis, Stringham, Gurley, Van Dam and 
Provan alleged constitutes the tortious interference with 
Plaintiff's contract rights with the State of Utah under said 
Lease No. 798 and Certificate of Registration No. PWF-SLO-129. 
81. Soltis, Stringham, Gurley, Van Dam and Provan, acting 
directly or through their principals, agents, subordinates and 
co-conspirators, including Gurley, wrongfully interfered with the 
contract rights of Plaintiff under Special Use Lease Agreement No, 
798 and Certificate No. PWF-SLO-129, in bad faith and in disregard 
of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203. Van Dam, Soltis 
and Stringham aided and abetted Provan and his subordinates, 
including Gurley, or counseled and advised and acted in concert 
and conspiracy with them in the bad faith breach of Plaintiff's 
contract rights. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
82. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56, 74 and 76. 
83. Gurley acted intentionally and improperly to interfere 
with Plaintiff's performance of his contract with the State of 
Utah by preventing Plaintiff's performance or making Plaintiff's 
performance under said Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 and 
Certificate No. PWF-SLO-129 more expensive and burdensome, 
including restraining or excluding Plaintiff from the place where 
the contract must be performed and depriving Plaintiff and his 
co-lessees of the necessary equipment and the live, domestic game 
birds necessary to perform the contract. 
84. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 77 
through 81. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
85. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56 and 76. 
86. Provan permitted Gurley to act as his subordinate or 
inferior agent, knowing or having reason to know that Gurley would 
act wrongfully as alleged herein, and Provan disregarded his duty 
to control the conduct of Gurley having knowledge, or being 
charged with the knowledge, that Gurley would harm members of the 
public, including Plaintiff, if not controlled. 
87. Provan is liable to Plaintiff for the conduct of Gurley 
because his employment, or continuing of the employment of Gurley, 
constitutes the intentional or tortious employment of incompetent 
or dangerous inferior agents or servants and failure to control 
them or give them adequate instructions. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
88. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56 and 76. 
89. Gurley destroyed the property of Plaintiff, or refused to 
surrender it to Plaintiff in a reasonable time after demand by 
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Plaintiff that he do so, and intentionally destroyed Plaintiff's 
bird pen and related facilities or so materially altered its 
physical condition as to change its identity and character, and is 
liable for conversion thereof. 
NINTH CAUSE OP ACTION 
90. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56. 
91. Provan, Soltis and Van Dam were in constructive 
possession of Plaintiff's property, by virtue of Provan's status 
as the superior to Gurley, and by virtue of the statutory 
obligation of Provan, Soltis and Van Dam under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-24-2, and refused and ignored the proper demand of Plaintiff 
that they return Plaintiff's property. 
92. Provan, Soltis and Van Dam are liable to Plaintiff in 
conversion. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
93. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56 and 76. 
94. The conduct of Gurley was outside the scope of his 
employment, including in particular by virtue of the determination 
of The Court in said Docket No. 900 300 302 that "Peace officers, 
including Conservation Officers such as [Gurley], are prohibited 
by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15 from breaking into 
an enclosure such as that owned by Plaintiff" and that "the 
conduct of [Gurley] was therefore without probable cause or 
authority under provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1 that 
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Conservation Officers shall follow the same procedure 
in . . . enforcement of this code, as other peace officers." 
95. Provan breached his duty to exercise reasonable care to 
control Gurley, after knowing or being charged with the knowledge 
that Gurley was acting outside of the scope of his employment and 
harming Plaintiff and his property. 
96. Provan is further liable to Plaintiff for the wrongful 
conduct of Gurley, Provan having retained Gurley in his employment 
after knowing, or being charged with knowledge, that Gurley was in 
the habit of misbehaving and abusing his authority as a peace 
officer and causing damage to Plaintiff and other members of the 
public. 
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
97. Plaintiff repeats the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 
56, 75, 76, 94 and 95. 
98. The conduct of Soltis and Stringham was outside the scope 
of their employment, including in particular by virtue of the 
provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 3.3, 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar Association, 
DR 7-102(A)(4) and DR 7-102(A)(6), ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility, and proscriptions against falsification of 
government records at Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-511, falsification of 
legal process at Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-513, and filing of false 
statements at Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-502, 503 and 504. 
99. Provan knew, or was chargeable with knowledge, that the 
only effective control which he could exercise over the wrongful 
conduct of Gurley was to discharge Gurley as Provan7s subordinate. 
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By retaining Gurley as a subordinate employee to Provan, Provan 
subjected himself to liability to Plaintiff and others for damages 
caused by the wrongful conduct of Gurley. 
100. Van Dam breached his duty to exercise reasonable care to 
control Soltis and Stringham, after knowing or being charged with 
the knowledge that Soltis and Stringham were acting outside of the 
scope of their employment and harming Plaintiff and his property. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendants as 
follows: 
A. Enjoining Defendant Gurley, or any persons acting as 
agents of Defendant Gurley or in concert or participation with 
Defendant Gurley, from interfering, directly or indirectly, with 
Plaintiff's rights under his lease with the State of Utah or the 
rights of Plaintiff or Plaintiff's partners and affiliates under 
their certificate of registration with the Wildlife Resources 
Division, and further enjoining Defendant Gurley or any persons 
acting in concert or participation with him from taking any action 
against Plaintiff, or dog training groups of which Plaintiff is a 
member or which Plaintiff is affiliated with, directly or 
indirectly, with respect to dog training and/or dog trials. 
B. For money damages in the amount of $1,000.00 for 
destruction of Plaintiff's bird pens and related facilities; 
C. For money damages in the amount of $10,000.00 for 
interference with Plaintiff's contract rights; 
D. For money damages in the amount of $50,000.00 for damages 
to Plaintiff's character and reputation; 
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E. For money damages for Plaintiff's anxiety, rage, 
apprehension, worry and other mental anguish in the amount as 
shall be proved at trial. 
F. For costs of this action, including a reasonable amount 
for attorneys' fees; and 
G. For such further and additional relief as the Court 
determines proper. 
Bryce E. Roe, Esq. 
Daniel Darger, Esq. 
Parker M. Nielson, Esq. 
/ % « & y
 Parker M. Nielson 
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This matter came before the court on plaintiff's Motion 
and defendants' Cross-motions for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff 
Parker M. Nielson was represented by himself, Bryce E. Roe, and 
Daniel Darger. Defendants Soltis, Stringham, Provan, Van Dam, 
Attorney General, and Division of Wildlife Resources were 
represented by Harold G. Christensen and Richard A. Van Wagoner. 
Defendant Dale Gurley was represented by Dennis C. Ferguson. The 
parties filed extensive memoranda and supporting materials, after 
which the court heard oral argument and took the matter under 
advisement. Now being fully advised, the court renders its 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
No. 92-C-0485G 
Judge J. Thomas Greene 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Parker Nielson trains hunting dogs as a 
hobby. On February 1, 1989, plaintiff and two dog-training 
associates entered into a Special Use Lease Agreement with the 
Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry. Under this agreement, 
the State leased to plaintiff and his associates a parcel of land 
in Tooele County for the purpose of "releasing and propagating 
game birds for hunting dog training and conducting non-commercial 
competition of hunting dogs." Plaintiff maintained a bird pen 
and related facilities for raising and possessing live game birds 
on or near the leased property, about eight miles from his 
temporary residence in Vernon.1 After completing his training 
activities, plaintiff would not immediately collect his birds. 
Instead, he would rely on the birds' "covey" instinct to draw 
them back to the location of the bird pen, and eventually into 
the recapture cones.2 
Plaintiff's claims arise out of two separate but 
related events. The first event occurred on September 9, 1990, 
the opening day of bird hunting season. On the day before, 
Plaintiff claims that the bird pen was on the leased 
property. Defendant Gurley claims that the enclosure was on land 
owned by the United States Forest Service. For purposes of 
summary judgment, the court will assume plaintiff's pen was 
located on the leased land. 
2Chukars' "covey11 instinct directs the birds to gather in 
groups. By leaving one bird in his pen, plaintiff would rely on 
the covey instinct to draw the roaming birds through the 
recapture cones to obtain companionship with the bird inside. 
2 
plaintiff had purchased four chukars, game birds which plaintiff 
intended to use in connection with his dog training activities. 
On the morning of September 9th, plaintiff took three of the 
birds out of his pen and began his training regimen. At that 
time, game officer Dale Gurley of the Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources was patrolling the Vernon-Bennion area of Tooele 
County.3 It appears that plaintiff and Officer Gurley were well 
acquainted. They had been involved in various confrontations 
stemming from their disagreement as to the appropriateness and 
legality of some of plaintiff's dog training activities. Gurley 
maintains that while he was patrolling the area on September 9th, 
he came upon two hunters who told him they had seen a bird trap 
nearby, containing four game birds. Gurley claims that he 
followed the hunters' directions and discovered plaintiff's bird 
pen, which contained one bird. Gurley, thinking the pen was an 
illegal trap, confiscated parts of it, and disabled the remaining 
portion. 
A brief description of the bird pen is in order. The 
pen was made of chicken wire and plywood. Its purpose was to 
recapture plaintiff's game birds after training activities. Feed 
and water were placed inside the pen. Birds obtained access to 
3Plaintiff claims that Gurley watched his training 
activities from a distance for about 3 0 minutes. Gurley denies 
this. However plaintiff does not allege that Gurley saw 
plaintiff's bird pen before September 9, 1990 or knew where it 
was located. 
3 
the pen through two "recapture cones" located just above the 
ground. The wide end of the recapture cone was on the outside of 
the pen to facilitate entry. The narrow end of the cone was on 
the inside of the pen so that the birds, once inside, would not 
try to escape. There was a rectangular net wire propped up 
against the tube to help guide the birds inside. Several dog 
training bird bands were located on a wire ring attached to the 
pen. However, there was no band on the one bird Gurley found 
inside. The door to the pen was locked. 
At the time he discovered the pen, Gurley claims that 
he did not know who the owner of the pen was, although later that 
day, he was told that the bird pen belonged to plaintiff Parker 
Nielson. 
The second event occurred on April 18, 1991, and 
involved the accuracy of an affidavit filed in connection with a 
state civil action brought by plaintiff against Gurley for 
damages resulting from the confiscation of the bird pen. The 
State had assigned Assistant Attorneys General John Soltis and 
Reed Stringham to represent Gurley in that case. Plaintiff filed 
a motion for summary judgment. In connection with his response 
to plaintiff's motion, Gurley filed an affidavit. Reed Stringham 
assisted Gurley in preparing the affidavit and John Soltis 
assisted in preparing the response memorandum. In his affidavit, 
Gurley asserted that he had issued plaintiff a citation for 
maintaining an illegal wildlife trap. In reality, while a 
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citation had been filled out, it had not been filed or served on 
the plaintiff. The state court granted plaintiffs summary 
judgment motion. About four months later, plaintiff moved to 
strike Gurley's affidavit because it contained inaccurate 
statements. The state court granted plaintiff/s motion and 
awarded plaintiff over $3,000 in sanctions. The state action is 
still pending. 
Plaintiff filed the present action alleging violations 
of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. 
Plaintiff has also included various pendant state claims. All 
the claims are before the court and are ripe for decision. 
ANALYSIS 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This court will grant summary judgment if the 
"pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.11 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The court reviews the "factual record and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing summary judgment." Applied Genetics Int/1 v. 
First Affiliated S&c. Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(citing Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 613 (10th 
Cir. 1988) . The moving party must carry its burden to show the 
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absence of a genuine issue for trial. The opposing party may not 
rest on the allegations or denials of its pleadings, but must 
come forward with sufficient evidence to establish specific 
triable issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
324 (1986); Gonzales v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co., 923 F.2d 1417, 
1419 (10th Cir.1991). In considering summary judgment, the judge 
is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the 
matter, but rather determine whether there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 
(1986). 
OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
Plaintiff requests the court to apply the theory of 
offensive collateral estoppel and adopt the findings made by the 
state court in its determination of plaintiff's summary judgment 
motion. In Griffin v. Strong, 739 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Utah 1990), 
this court identified the four elements recognized by the Tenth 
Circuit as necessary to apply collateral estoppel: 
1) The issue decided in the prior adjudication was 
identical with the one presented in the action in 
question; 
2) There was a final adjudication on the merits; 
3) The party against whom estoppel is asserted is a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; 
4) The issue in the first case was competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated. 
Id. at 1501 (citing In re Lombard, 739 F.2d 499, 502 (10th Cir. 
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1984)). As in Griffin, this case involves the application of 
offensive collateral estoppel. This means that collateral 
estoppel is sought to be used as an offensive tool to preclude 
the defendants from making arguments which otherwise might be 
available to them. The Supreme Court has granted trial courts 
broad discretion in determining when offensive collateral 
estoppel should be applied. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322, 331 (1979). 
Applying the above factors, it becomes apparent that 
collateral estoppel should not be applied in this case against 
any of the defendants. First, only Gurley was a party or in 
privity with a party in the state proceeding. This bars the use 
of collateral estoppel against the other defendants. Second, 
there is a serious question whether the same issues presently 
before the court were fully adjudicated in the state proceeding. 
The transcript of the state summary judgment hearing indicates 
that the court did not sufficiently discuss whether Gurley had 
probable cause to confiscate plaintiff's bird pen. As will be 
seen hereafter, whether Gurley had probable cause is the central 
issue in plaintiff's § 1983 claim. For these reasons, the court 
declines to apply the principle of offensive collateral estoppel 
against any of the defendants. 
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I. PLAINTIFF'S § 198 3 CLAIM AGAINST WILDLIFE GAME OFFICER 
ARISING OUT OF CONFISCATION OF PLAINTIFF'S BIRD PEN. 
Plaintiff alleges that Gurley violated his civil rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 19834 when Gurley disabled and confiscated 
portions of his bird pen. 
The two essential elements in a § 1983 action are: 
M(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person 
acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct 
deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 
the Constitution or laws of the United Stat€>s.n Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) overruled on other grounds by 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). It is not disputed 
that Gurley acted under color of state law when he seized 
portions of plaintiff's bird pen. However, the parties do 
dispute whether Gurley's actions deprived plaintiff of any 
constitutional right. In this case, there are two possible 
constitutional rights upon which plaintiff may base a § 1983 
claim: (1) Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (2) Plaintiff's 
4Section 1983 imposes civil liability on 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State ... subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States 
... to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws.... 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
8 
Fourteenth Amendment right against deprivation of property 
without due process of law,5 After considerable review, the 
court determines that neither of these constitutional rights were 
violated by Gurley. 
A. Unreasonable Search and Seizure Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
Plaintiff claims that Gurley's confiscation of his 
bird pen constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.6 Gurley confiscated 
plaintiff's bird pen because he thought it was an illegal 
wildlife trap, but he did so without first obtaining a warrant. 
The Fourth Amendment generally requires law enforcement officials 
to obtain a warrant before searching for and/or confiscating 
evidence. However, there are exceptions under which a 
warrantless search and seizure is valid. One of these exceptions 
is the "plain view doctrine" under which the seizure of an item 
5Plaintiff has been less than clear as to which of these 
constitutional rights were allegedly violated by Officer Gurley's 
action. Accordingly, the court will discuss both rights. 
6The Fourth Amendment protects the right of individuals to 
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
The Fourth Amendment itself only applies to the federal 
government. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to state 
governments. For this reason, plaintiff's claim is more 
accurately defined as being based upon the Fourth Amendment as 
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, in order to easily distinguish between the 
different constitutional rights implicated in plaintiff's 
complaint, the court will by-pass reference to the incorporation 
doctrine and merely refer to plaintiff's search and seizure claim 
as arising under the Fourth Amendment. 
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without a warrant is valid if the following circumstances exist: 
(1) The law enforcement officer is legitimately on the 
premises;7 
(2) The officer sees the item in plain view;8 
(3) The officer has probable cause to believe that the 
item is evidence, fruit, or instrumentality of crime, 
or contraband;9 
(4) The incriminating character of the item is 
immediately apparent;10 and 
(5) It would not be reasonably practicable to obtain a 
warrant prior to seizure of the item.11 
These elements will be considered seriatim. 
1. Legitimacy of Presence on Premises and Seeing 
the Item in Plain View. 
There is no doubt that the first and second 
elements of the plain view doctrine are present in this case. 
Plaintiff's bird pen was located in a remote area of Tooele 
County consisting primarily of state and federal lands. Gurley 
was a state game officer assigned to that area. As such, Gurley 
had the right to patrol the area and be in position to discover 
plaintiff's bird pen on the day it was dismantled and 
7Horton v. California. 496 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1990). 
8Id. at 136. 
9Id. at 142; Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987). 
10Horton v. California, 496 U.S. at 136. 
nId. at 137; Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980). 
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confiscated.12 
2. Probable Cause and Incriminating Character 
The third element—the key issue herein—is 
whether Gurley had probable cause to believe that plaintiff's 
bird pen was an illegal trap. Probable cause is a question of 
law determinable when "known facts and circumstances are 
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence the belief 
that an offense has been or is being committed." United States 
v. Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United 
States v. McEachin. 670 F.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
Defendant Gurley maintains that he acted pursuant to § 23-20-1(2) 
of the Utah Code which directs state game officers to seize 
illegal wildlife traps. Section 23-20-1(2) reads as follows: 
Materials and devices used for the unlawful 
taking or possessing of protected wildlife 
shall be seized, and upon a finding by the 
court that they were used in the unlawful 
taking or possessing of protected wildlife, 
the materials and devices shall be 
confiscated by the court, conveyed to the 
division, and upon the expiration of time for 
appeal, sold at a public auction or otherwise 
disposed of by the division. 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1(2). State wildlife regulations require 
valid traps to be equipped with a license tag.13 Plaintiff's 
12Since wildlife is considered state property, game officers 
have the responsibility of patrolling all land in the state 
whether the land is owned by the state or the federal government. 
13Traps and other trapping devices used in taking any 
wildlife must be permanently marked or tagged with the registered 
number of the trapper using them. Identification numbers must be 
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bird pen was not equipped with such a license tag. In addition, 
state wildlife regulations direct that game birds may not be 
"released" without state authorization, and that if they do 
"escape," the birds become state property.14 Gurley and the 
Division of Wildlife argue that once plaintiff let the birds roam 
after training exercises, the birds effectively "escaped" from 
his possession, and became the state's property. As such, it is 
submitted that the birds could not be recaptured without first 
complying with the state's regulations regarding traps, including 
the requirement that registered traps be equipped with a license 
tag. 
Plaintiff maintains that his pen did not need a license 
tag because it was not a "trap."15 Plaintiff argues, rather, 
legible and at least 1/4 inch in height. Utah Admin. Code R608-
11-3(C)(1) (1991). 
14The applicable regulation reads, 
Live game birds may not be released or 
abandoned without first obtaining written 
authorization from the Director of the 
Division. Native and naturalized game birds 
that escape from captivity become the 
property of the state. 
Utah Admin. Code R608-4-3 (1991). 
15Plaintiff argues that the license tag requirement is 
inapplicable here because it is found in R608-11, which deals 
with the taking of "furbearers." The definition of "furbearer" 
does not include birds. Utah Admin. Code R608-ll-2(7) (1991). 
However, the license requirement applies to the 
trapping of "any wildlife." The definition of wildlife includes 
"[a]ny species of vertebrate animal life except feral animals 
generally living in a state of nature." Utah Code Ann. 23-13-
12 
that his bird pen was a "private wildlife farm" which he was 
legally allowed to maintain pursuant to Division of Wildlife 
regulations. Utah Admin. Code R608-4-2(7) (1991).16 Those 
regulations require registered owners of private wildlife farms 
to exhibit, if asked, registration documents. Utah Admin. Code 
R608-4-3 (1991) . In this regard, plaintiff says that he had that 
proof of registration with him on September 9, 1990 and that all 
Gurley needed to do was find him and ask for the appropriate 
documents. Further, plaintiff contends that even though he did 
not collect his birds immediately after training, the birds were 
not "released" nor did they "escape" as defined in R608-4-3. 
Plaintiff's bird pen may have been legal. However, 
that is not the issue before the court. Rather, the court must 
determine whether from the facts and surrounding circumstances 
presented in connection with the motion, a person of reasonable 
prudence could believe that the bird pen was an illegal wildlife 
trap. Regardless of how plaintiff chooses to describe his pen, 
he cannot escape the fact that the pen's purpose was to attract 
2(40). "Feral Animals" are defined as "any animal which is 
normally domesticated but has reverted to the wild." Utah Code 
Ann. § 23-13-2(10). Chukars clearly do not fit the definition of 
"feral" and therefore must be considered "wildlife." Hence, the 
license requirement would apply to the trapping of chukars. 
^Regulation R608-4-2(7) defines a private wildlife farm as 
"[a]n enclosed place such as, but not limited to, a pen or 
aviary, where privately owned game birds are propagated or kept 
and which enclosure restricts the birds from escaping into the 
wild." Utah Admin. Code R608-4-2(7) (1991). 
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and capture game birds. The pen looked like a trap, it 
functioned as a trap, and it functioned without any distinction 
between plaintiff's game birds and other wildlife. Its trap-like 
attributes would be immediately apparent to any reasonable 
person. 
With respect to the fourth element necessary to justify 
a seizure without a warrant, the fact that plaintiff's bird pen 
lacked a license tag would warrant a prudent law enforcement 
officer to believe that it was an illegal trap. The 
incriminating character of the pen would thus be readily and 
immediately apparent. 
For the aforesaid reasons, the court finds and rules 
that Gurley had probable cause to believe that plaintiff's bird 
pen was an illegal trap. 
3. Practicability of Obtaining Warrant 
The final issue is whether it would have been 
reasonably practicable for Gurley to obtain a warrant prior to 
confiscating parts of the bird pen. In this regard, it is 
apparent that Gurley discovered plaintiff's recapture pen in a 
remote area, far away from the individuals and procedures 
necessary to obtain a warrant. In the time required to apply for 
and obtain a warrant, the "illegal trap11 could have been easily 
dismantled or moved. For this reason, the court finds that it 
would not have been reasonably practicable for Gurley to obtain a 
warrant prior to seizure of the pen. 
14 
Since the court has found all of the elements necessary 
to justify application of the plain view doctrine exception to 
the warrant requirement, it follows that there was no 
unreasonable search and seizure in this case. Accordingly, 
plaintiff's § 1983 claim based upon the Fourth Amendment must 
fail. 
B. Deprivation of Procedural Due Process Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
To successfully bring a § 1983 action for the 
deprivation of procedural due process, plaintiff must establish 
that the defendant, acting under color of state law, (1) deprived 
plaintiff of a fundamental requirement of procedural due 
process;17 and (2) engaged in deliberate misconduct.18 
The fundamental requirement of procedural due process 
is the opportunity to be heard. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 
527 (1981),19 the Supreme Court held that a state postdeprivation 
remedy provides the opportunity to be heard and thus satisfies 
the requirements of procedural due process. In fact, the 
postdeprivation remedy is adequate even though it "may not 
provide the [plaintiff] with all the relief which may have been 
17Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1981) overruled on 
other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
18Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-33 (1986). 
19Parratt was overruled by Daniels insofar as it allowed 
procedural due process claims under § 1983 for merely negligent 
conduct. Daniels 474 U.S. at 330-31. 
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available if he could have proceeded under § 1983." Id. at 544; 
see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) ("an 
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state 
employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural 
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is 
available.") . 
In this case it is manifest that plaintiff has received 
an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the confiscation of his 
bird pen. Plaintiff has aggressively pursued a state action 
against Gurley, has been given the opportunity to be heard, and 
has been successful in that action on summary judgment. 
Plaintiff also cannot establish that Gurley engaged in 
deliberate misconduct. In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 
(1986), the Supreme Court held that mere negligence of a state 
official cannot "deprive" an individual of his or her procedural 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 33 0-31. 
Rather, the guarantee of due process applies to "deliberate" 
decisions of government. Id. at 331; Apodaca v. Rio Arriba 
County Sheriff's Dept.. 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th Cir. 1990). 
The court has already determined that Gurley acted with probable 
cause when he disabled and confiscated plaintiff's bird pen. The 
existence of such probable cause defeats plaintiff's allegation 
that Gurley engaged in deliberate misconduct. 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff's claim of alleged 
16 
deprivation of his procedural due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment is denied. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST STATE ATTORNEYS AND STATE 
WILDLIFE OFFICER ARISING OUT OF THE FILING OF AN ALLEGEDLY FALSE 
AFFIDAVIT. 
In response to plaintiffs summary judgment motion in 
the state action, Gurley filed an affidavit with the aid of 
Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham. In his affidavit, 
Gurley testified that he had mailed a citation to plaintiff for 
violation of state wildlife laws. In reality, a citation had 
been filled out, but had never been filed or delivered to the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that the filing of Gurley's 
affidavit constituted perjury and deprived him of his substantive 
due process right of freedom from perjury in court proceedings.20 
Plaintiff cites three cases to support his position 
that perjury, in and of itself, is actionable under § 1983. 
Brown v. Johnston, 675 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Spears v. 
Conlisk. 440 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. 111. 1977); Moore^v. Koelzer, 457 
F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972). 
Brown,21 Spears,22 and Moore23 involved state actors 
20Gurley, Stringham, and Soltis dispute plaintiff's 
characterization of the affidavit as perjury. However, the court 
will adopt plaintiff's characterization for purposes of summary 
judgment. 
21In Brown, the defendants allegedly conspired with the 
district attorney to bring unfounded forgery charges against the 
plaintiff. The court recognized the availability of a § 1983 
action for malicious prosecution as well as abuse of process. 
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falsely bringing criminal charges against the plaintiff. The 
cases involved malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and the 
plaintiffs right to a fair criminal trial.24 While perjury was 
involved in all three cases, it was included inside another 
actionable theory. It did not stand on its own. 
Brown, Spears, and Moore are inapposite and do not 
support recognition of a § 1983 action based on perjury alone. 
The present action is based upon the conduct of a defendant in a 
civil proceeding, not upon the actions of police or prosecutors 
Brown, 675 F. Supp. at 289-90. 
22In Spears, defendants falsely accused plaintiff of criminal 
wrongdoing and gave false testimony at his criminal trial. The 
court held that the police officers' conduct deprived the 
plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendment rights and was actionable 
under § 1983, apparently on the theory of malicious prosecution. 
In this regard, the court in Spears cited to a similar Seventh 
Circuit case, Davis v. Murphy, 559 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1977) in 
which the Seventh Circuit recognized a § 1983 claim against 
police officers and firemen for assaulting, unlawfully arresting, 
and maliciously attempting to have false chcirges issued against 
the plaintiffs. 
23In Moore, the state defendants allegedly falsified legal 
documents and falsely testified at the plaintiff's criminal 
trial. The court held that a violation of an individuals Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment rights was actionable under § 1983. Moore, 
457 F.2d at 893. The court did not mention an action based on 
perjury alone. 
24In Miller v. Glanz. 948 F.2d 1562 (10th Cir. 1991), the 
Tenth Circuit held that state defendants are absolutely immune 
from claims based upon alleged conspiracies to commit perjury in 
criminal proceedings. Id. at 1570. In addition, the court 
stated that, ff[W]e find nothing in the legislative history of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 suggesting that Congress intended to 
provide a cause of action for conspiracy to commit perjury in 
order to obtain a criminal conviction.11 Id. at 1571. 
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 Plaintiff has cited two cases which involve the right of 
access to the courts. Both cases held that plaintiff's right of 
access was not sufficiently impeded to form the basis for a § 
1983 action. Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 804 
F.2d 953, 959 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Graham cannot claim, however, 
that the defendants completely denied him access to the courts, 
since he successfully pursued his state court action,, , " ) ; 
Rvland v. Shapiro, 586 F. Supp. 1495, 1502 (W.D. La. 1984) ("The 
defendants ... did not interfere with the Ryland's access to the 
Louisiana courts for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death 
claim."). 
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relates to the filing of Gurley's affidavit in state court.27 
III. PLAINTIFF'S § 1985 ACTION AGAINST STATE ATTORNEYS AND STATE 
WILDLIFE OFFICER. 
Plaintiff asserts claims against Gurley, Stringham, and 
Soltis based upon the second clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) and § 
1985(3) which create liability for conspiracies which deny 
plaintiffs equal protection of the laws.28 The Supreme Court has 
28 
27Even if plaintiff had been able to formulate an actionable 
§ 1983 theory, he could not have prevailed against Gurley. 
Gurley has absolute immunity with regard to the filing of his 
affidavit. The Supreme Court has stated that there can be no § 
1983 liability arising out of testimony given in a prior judicial 
proceeding. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); Miller v. 
Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1570 (10th Cir. 1991). 
The second part of § 1985(2) and § 1985(3) read as follows: 
(2)... if two or more persons conspire for 
the purpose of impeding, hindering, 
obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the 
due course of justice in any State, or 
Territory, with intent to deny to.any citizen 
the equal protection of the laws, or to 
injure him or his property for lawfully 
enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the 
right of any person, or class of persons, to 
the equal protection of the laws; 
(3) If two or more persons in any State or 
Territory conspire or go in disguise on the 
highway or on the premises of another, for 
the purpose of depriving, either directly or 
indirectly, any person or class of persons of 
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
privileges and immunities under the laws; or 
if two or more persons conspire to prevent by 
force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen 
who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving 
his support or advocacy in a legal manner, 
toward or in favor of the election of any 
lawfully qualified person as an elector for 
20 
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Protected classes under the civil rights conspiracy 
statutes have included women, New York State National 
Organization for Women v. Terry, 886 F\, /d 1319, 1358-59 (2d Cir, 
1989), and migrant farm workers, Rios v. Marshall, 5 3C F Supp. 
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President or Vice President, or as a Member 
of Congress on account of such support or 
advocacy; an any case of conspiracy set forth 
in this section, if one or more persons 
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any 
act in furtherance of the object of such 
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his 
person or property, or deprived of having and 
exercising any right or privilege of a 
citizen of the United States, the party so 
injured or deprived may have an action for 
the recovery of damages occasioned by such 
injury or deprivation, against any one or 
more of the conspirators. 
42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) & (3). 
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people whose cars were towed without probable cause, Rogers v. 
Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 202-203 (7th Cir. 
1985). 
Plaintiff requests that the court include dog trainers 
as a protected class. Even the most liberal interpretation of 
the civil rights laws does not allow the court to include dog 
trainers as a racial or similarly protected class. For this 
reason, plaintiff's § 1985(2) & (3) claims must fail. 
IV. PLAINTIFF'S §1986 CLAIM AGAINST STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND 
DIRECTOR OF STATE DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES. 
Section 1986 imposes liability on persons who refuse to 
prevent § 1985 violations when they have knowledge of the 
violation and power to prevent it.29 Plaintiff claims that Utah 
State Attorney General Paul Van Dam and Division of Wildlife 
Resources Director Timothy Provan had constructive knowledge and 
control over the activities of their subordinates and failed to 
prevent them from violating plaintiff's civil rights. 
Section 1986 liability only arises when there is a § 
29
 Section 1986 reads in part: 
Every person who, having knowledge that any 
of the wrongs conspired to be done, and 
mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are 
about to be committed, and having power to 
prevent or aid in preventing the commission 
of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, 
... shall be liable... . 
42 U.S.C. § 1986. 
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Counsel for defendants are directed to prepare and 
lodge with the court a form of judgment consistent with this 
Memorandum Decision and Order after first complying with Local 
Rule 206(b). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: DECEMBER [\p . 1992 
t^y. >cU-ae^J2^ 
J ^7 Thomas Greene 
IITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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i AFFIDAVIT OF 
i PARKER M. NIELSON 
i Civil No. 900 300 302 
i Judge Pat B. Brian 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PARKER M. NIELSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. That he is the Plaintiff herein, and submits the following 
affidavit pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-505(1), Rules of 
Judicial Administration, in support of an award of an amount equal 
to the fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time 
authorized by the Minute Entry of the Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
herein dated December 23, 1991. 
2. Affiant affirms on his personal knowledge and under oath, 
that he has been required to expend professional time in searching 
the records of the Third Circuit Court in Tooele, Utah, and the 
Sixth Circuit Court in Nephi, Utah, concerning assertions of 
GOOdOtf 
Defendant, Dale Gurley, contained in his affidavit herein dated 
April 18, 1991, writing correspondence to counsel for Gurley 
herein requesting voluntary compliance with requirements of the 
rules of civil procedure and of legal ethics concerning the 
obvious falsity of said affidavit, and in filing and briefing 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley or 
Require Compliance with Rules 7 and 11, as follows: 
Searching records of the Third Circuit Court, 
Tooele, Utah, including preparation and execution 
of Certificate that no record of Citation No. 
114020 is on file 1.50 hours 
Telephone calls to Sixth Circuit Court, 
Nephi, Utah, including preparation and execution 
of Certificate that no record of Citation No. 
114020 is on file 75 hours 
Correspondence to counsel (copies of which were 
attached to Plaintiffs motion dated November 14, 
1991) requesting voluntary compliance, as follows: 
6/12/91 (including review of file 
necessary to compose the letter). 2.50 hours 
9/3/91 (including research time 
necessary to compose the letter). 1.80 hours 
10/9/91 letter to Van Dam 75 hours 
10/14/91 letter to Van Dam 
(including preparation of 
enclosed memorandum) 1.50 hours 
11/8/91 letter to Van Dam 50 hours 
Total hours, correspondence 7.05 hours 
Preparation of Motion dated November 14, 1991 
and supporting memorandum 10.00 hours 
Preparation of Reply memorandum dated 




 " AAA^rt P) 
3. Affiant further states that, had he not been required to 
devote his time to said matters, his time would have been applied 
to legal services for his established clients in his profession as 
an attorney and counselor at law, principally to ongoing 
securities litigation in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Civil No. 90-C-224S, as to which affiant's 
services are billed on an hourly basis at $130.00 per hour. 
4. Affiant further states that the fair and reasonable value 
of Plaintiff's professional time set forth herein is $3,289.00, 
and affirms the reasonableness of said sum for comparable legal 
services. The reasonableness of said amount is further indicated 
by the assertion by counsel for Gurley at page 4 of his Reply 
Memorandum herein dated December 20, 1991, that "Gurley's 
attorneys fees . . . now exceed $15,000" for a period of time 
inclusive of the time when Plaintiff's professional time set forth 
herein was necessary. 
HParker M. Nielson 
- 3 - 00090o 
Parker M. Nielson, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the Affiant herein; that he has read the above and 
foregoing Affidavit of Parker M. Nielson; knows the contents 
thereof and that the same is true of his own knowledge, excepting 
as to matters therein alleged upon information and belief and as 
to those matters he believes them to be true. 
barker M. Nielson 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this i? n£ day of January, 
1992. -
• < - • / • / 
NOTARY PUBLIC s , ^ -
Residing a t : fjyc£ZVVfee ^ttZf, Jet 
My C o m m i s s i o n E x p i r e s : fmmmZrns^"mmm™*""H^tvPMoT"'*^ 
Kr—mKix UNDATUSBOENRSCH J 
My CanmiMbn Expires I 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of January, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF PARKER M. 
NIELSON was mailed first class, postage prepaid to: 
John P. Soltis 
Reed M. Stringham III 
Assistant Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(0402) 
S&(AUSU„, ^Uujf Ja^otUcA^ 
- 4 - 000905 
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: AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL 
: THOMAS MOXLEY, ESQUIRE 
: IN SUPPORT OF PARKER M. 
: NIELSON!S APPLICATION FOR 
: REIMBURSEMENT FOR 
: PROFESSIONAL TIME 
Case No. 900300302 PD 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PAUL THOMAS MOXLEY, being of full age and duly sworn upon his 
oath deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney practicing in Salt Lake City, State of 
Utah and am a shareholder in the law firm of Campbell Maack & 
Sessions. I have been admitted to practice law since 1973 and am 
a past-chairman of the Securities Section of the Utah State Bar and 
am presently on the Board of Bar Commissioners for the State of 
Utah. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the professional skills of 
Parker M. Nielson and have been acquainted with him since the 
1970s. For a period of about five years, I worked on a number of 
cases (one of these cases resulted in a writ of certiorari being 
filed with the United States Supreme Court)with Parker M. Nielson 
and shared offices with him for approximately two years in the 
nnnas1 
early 1980s. I am also familiar with Parker M. Nielson as a result 
of our both being active in the Securities Section and I have 
participated with him on panel discussions concerning securities 
litigation and also attended other CLE programs where Mr. Nielson 
has been a presenter. 
3. From my knowledge of Parker M. Nielson, I am aware of the 
following: 
a. Mr. Nielson has been a professor of law at the 
University of Utah; 
b. Mr. Nielson has been a lecturer for ALI and ABA and 
numerous other bar association committees. 
c. Mr. Nielson has an AV rating from Martin-Dale 
Hubbell which I understand is a rating that less 
than five percent of all lawyers have. 
d. Mr. Nielson has successfully taken a case to the 
United States Supreme Court and handled successful-
ly the Affiliated Ute case which is one of the more 
prominent security cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court in the last thirty years and I 
believe only a handful of Utah lawyers have suc-




4. I have reviewed the Affidavit of Parker M. Nielson 
wherein he states that his professional time is being billed at 
$130 per hour and from my experience as a lawyer in this community 
that is a very reasonable fee given his experience, expertise and 
standing in the legal community. 
Dated this Z> day of January, 1992. 
W ^ P J^^^n^ 
Paul Thomas Moxley 
PAUL THOMAS MOXLEY, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: that he is the Affiant herein; that he has read the above and 
foregoing Affidavit of Paul Thomas Moxley; knows the contents 
thereof and that the same is true of his own knowledge, excepting 
as to matters therein alleged upon information and belief and as to 
those matters he believes them to be true. 
b-^ 
aul Thomas Moxley 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this S^s. day of 
January, 1992. 
My Commission Expires: 
T e r r - : r r * 2 i - ~ - r "•--<-*- nr~~-({s«fc<i£?*!,V1' 
ftf>~L.. VOJSS^ 
rtoTARY PUBLIC 
R e s i d i n g a t : S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
00090a 
